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iAbstract
Online applications that are open to participation lack reliable methods to es-
tablish the integrity of user-generated information. Users may unknowingly own
compromised devices, or intentionally publish forged information. In these scenar-
ios, applications need some way to determine the “correctness” of autonomously
generated information. Towards that end, this thesis presents a “trust-but-verify”
approach that enables open online applications to independently verify the infor-
mation generated by each participant. In addition to enabling independent verifi-
cation, our framework allows an application to verify less information from more
trustworthy users and verify more information from less trustworthy ones. Thus,
an application can trade-off performance for more integrity, or vice versa. We ap-
ply the trust-but-verify approach to three different classes of online applications
and show how it can enable 1) high-integrity, privacy-preserving, crowd-sourced
sensing 2) non-intrusive cheat detection in online games, and 3) effective spam
prevention in online messaging applications.
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1Chapter 1
THE PROBLEM
Online applications that encourage open participation remain vulnerable to spu-
rious information. As examples, consider the following scenarios: (i) A crowd-
sourced sensing application like Waze [143] collects real-time GPS data from its
users for map-building and traffic estimation but has no way to determine if the
published coordinates were indeed generated by a user physically present at that
location. Malicious users can report fake incidents to gain points and an elevated
status. They can also discourage others from taking a certain route by easily
creating multiple emulated devices and publishing locations in a way that indi-
cates congestion on that route, (ii) Malicious players of online games can access
hidden game client memory and learn peer secrets that inform their next move.
These moves would not normally occur without illegal access to hidden game client
memory and are a result of cheating, (iii) online messaging applications like Email,
Twitter, or Facebook still receive copious amounts of spam from software robots
that hijack user accounts [51, 80, 56].
This dissertation aims to provide online applications with the tools to distin-
guish between “genuine” and “fabricated” content. Of interest, is the scenario
where users generate and send the content to the application, which in turn, de-
termines the integrity of that content before processing it any further. Specifically,
this dissertation develops data integrity verification methods that (i) enable high-
integrity privacy-preserving crowd-sourced sensing applications, (ii) facilitate cheat
2detection in online games, and (iii) effectively combat spam in online messaging
applications.
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we discuss existing approaches that allow an application to verify
the integrity of user-generated content and explain why a new approach is needed.
Quite often, applications employ no specific integrity checking techniques. Thus,
the burden of validating published content is left to the end-user. For example,
the popular social network, Facebook [2], only provides guidelines on how users
can identify fake accounts [1]; the open, collaborative, and online encyclopedia,
Wikipedia [3], only provides guidelines on how readers can identify reliable sources
so that they can determine the validity of the published information for themselves
[4]. When integrity verification methods have been used by applications, they have
traditionally been based on reputation ratings [48, 66, 107], anomaly detection
[29, 26, 104, 78], or user-device monitoring [84, 112].
Reputation Ratings Reputation rating algorithms are used mainly by appli-
cations whose success depends on trust relationships between users. For example,
the popularity of the online marketplace, EBay [41], is attributed to its use of seller
and buyer ratings. The problem, however, is that users may not have any existing
trust relationships to begin with. Thus, the goal of a reputation rating algorithm
is to create and maintain these trust relationships.
A reputation rating algorithm defines, initializes, and updates a trust metric
or “reputation” for each user of the application. The fundamental assumption is
that a user’s past reputation is a good predictor of future behavior, implying that
a user with a better reputation rating can be trusted more. The reputation of a
given user is updated based on what other users perceive that user’s reputation
to be. Thus, each user assigns a reputation rating to every other user it interacts
3with. Then, multiple ratings for the same user are combined to determine an
overall reputation rating. How this rating is represented depends on the particular
reputation rating algorithm. For example, EBay [41] represents them as discrete
values, whereas Ganeriwal et al. [48] and Jsang et al. [66] represent them using
the Beta distribution.
An important factor in the success of a reputation rating algorithm is how the
overall rating for a particular user is calculated [76]. The overall rating for a given
user is a combination of ratings assigned by other users. There is also the issue of
combining the ratings one user assigns to another user across multiple interactions.
Several approaches have been proposed, the simplest being the average [76].
Unfortunately, reputation ratings are not directly applicable in the scenario un-
der consideration where users are generating and sending content to an application,
but not necessarily interacting with each other.
Anomaly Detection Anomaly detection is used mainly by applications that
collect numerical data from multiple sources, such as from Wireless Sensor Net-
works (WSNs) [29, 26, 104, 78]. The basic assumption is that clusters of sources
produce “similar looking” data (e.g. locality). The goal then is to identify data
samples that “look different” from what is considered “normal” for the cluster.
This requires creating a model for normal data and checking if incoming live data
adheres to that model.
A popular approach for building the model is Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) [65]. Given a set of multi-variate data samples, PCA’s goal is to reduce the
number of variables required to represent the data while still capturing most of the
variation in the data. The way PCA does this is by removing correlated variables
since they carry very little variance information and leave behind the uncorrelated
ones. This essentially reduces the number of dimensions required to represent the
data. Later, a live sample of data can be projected onto the reduced dimensions
4and checked if the projected point lies too far from the projections of the normal
data samples.
Unlike reputation rating algorithms, anomaly detection is directly applicable in
the crowd-sourced sensing scenario considered in Chapters 3 and 4 where the sen-
sors are personal mobile devices carried by people. However, as indicated earlier in
the Waze [143] example, anomaly detection solutions can be duped by a participant
that emulates multiple colluding participants (called “Sybils”) [37]. Additionally,
if the data sources are few, sparsely distributed, or constantly in motion as in
crowd-sourced sensing, anomaly detection may fail to be accurate [29].
Device Monitoring Device monitoring tries to ensure that the software users
employ to generate and send data to the application is running as expected. This
requires a monitoring service running on the user’s device that is in some way
trusted by the application.
Device monitoring approaches have been used to detect cheating in online
games [112, 69]. Warden [112, 84] is one such monitor used by the popular game
World of Warcraft [19]. Warden tries to find cheat code with known signatures
on a player’s machine by scanning the memory of all running processes. Due to
the use of signature-based detection via widespread scanning, Warden has suffered
from false positives, an inability to detect new cheats, performance issues, and has
been labeled “spyware” by the Electronic Frontier Foundation [81].
As a solution, a more conservative scanner, called Fides [69], was developed
by Kaiser et al. In addition to restricting scanning only to the game client, Fides
looked for anomalies rather than particular cheat signatures. This made Fides
more effective against new attacks whose signatures were not yet know. To detect
anomalies, Fides profiled the game client to establish a model for normal execu-
tion. The profile was then used on the game server to partially emulate the client
and validate memory signatures sent by the scanner. If the client-side memory
5signatures did not match the “normal” for a given stage in the game, then a client
was assumed to be cheating. However, since the scanner ran on the client — a ma-
chine in control of the cheater — it could be tampered with in ways that avoided
cheat detection. Other challenges included the complexity of accurate game client
profiling and emulation, determining the set of scanned memory locations that
when checked, would reliably detect unknown cheats, and earning a player’s trust
that the scanning will indeed be restricted to game client memory.
1.2 RESEARCH CHALLENGES
The research challenge is to develop integrity verification methods for user-generated
content that address the drawbacks discussed in the previous section, while sat-
isfying the constraints of the individual applications. Specifically, this disserta-
tion develops integrity verification mechanisms that enable high-integrity privacy-
preserving crowd-sourced sensing, non-intrusive cheat detection in online games,
and effective spam prevention in online messaging applications.
1.2.1 High-integrity Crowd-sourced Sensing
Crowd-sourced sensing systems allow people to voluntarily contribute sensed in-
formation (e.g. location, images, audio) using personal sensing devices like smart-
phones [43]. The volunteers collecting the data are called data sources and the
online portal publishing the data received from volunteers is called the data con-
sumer . In this scenario, the data consumer would like to determine if the sensory
data submitted by volunteers accurately represents the phenomenon being sensed.
This is challenging because data sources have autonomous control of their sensing
devices and could therefore modify its firmware to publish fabricated information
instead of what is actually sensed. Sources could also publish false sensor data
using emulated devices rather than physical sensors. Thus, we must find a way
6to convince the consumer that the sensed data originated from correctly function-
ing physical sensors that actually witnessed the phenomenon. This problem is
addressed in Chapter 3.
1.2.2 High-integrity Privacy-preserving Crowd-sourced Sensing
Another important issue in crowd-sourced sensing is location privacy. In general,
crowd-sourced sensory data is supplemented with a corresponding location that
indicates where that data was sensed. The problem is that the data consumer
could potentially track a source using the published locations. Thus, we must find
a way to guarantee the integrity of published locations without revealing those
locations to the data consumer. This problem is addressed in Chapter 4.
1.2.3 Non-intrusive Cheat Detection in Online Games
A lot of hidden information is present in client programs of most existing online
multi-player games (e.g. unexplored map regions, opponent resource information).
Although a lot of this information is not necessary to render the player’s current
view of the game, it is necessary to render any new views. Having local access
to this information results in efficient game rendering. The problem, is that the
unnecessary hidden information can be used to cheat. For example, a player could
use a “map hack” to uncover a hidden mine field that would otherwise only be
visible with special powers. Unfortunately, if this hidden information is not locally
present, but instead received on-demand from the server, then the game rendering
slows down significantly [75]. What is needed is a more efficient method to detect
moves that are a result of this kind of cheating while also being an alternative to
existing solutions that perform intrusive client-device scanning [112]. This problem
is addressed in Chapter 5.
71.2.4 Effective Spam Prevention in Online Messaging Applications
A lot of effort has been devoted to building accurate spam filters that can hide
spam from the user [59, 121, 130, 11], but little is done to effectively prevent it.
The proof-of-work approach has been proposed as an effective spam prevention
technique [40, 15, 149, 44, 68, 64, 77].
Proof-of-work systems can be used by online messaging applications to impose
a cost per online transaction. This cost is in terms of computational work, also
called a puzzle, that a client must correctly execute before being allowed to send a
message. The assumption is that solutions of puzzles are hard to compute and easy
to check [40, 39, 64], and that more malicious users (e.g. spammers) are issued
“harder” puzzles [74, 77]. Puzzles can be computed by the browser behind-the-
scenes and require no user involvement. However, the work done in computing
puzzle solutions is most often wasted because the solution provides no other value
than to aid in checking that the puzzle was correctly executed. The Reusable
Proof-of-Work (RePoW) approach [64] proposes using puzzles whose solutions can
be used for a greater purpose (e.g. protein folding [95]).
Unfortunately, there are very few known reusable proof-of-work puzzles whose
solutions are easy to check [64, 17]. What is needed is a proof-of-work system that
enables issuing generic computational tasks (e.g. protein folding [95]) whose result
can be checked more efficiently than recomputing the task itself. This problem is
addressed in Chapter 6.
1.3 SOLUTION OVERVIEW
We address the research challenges discussed in the previous section by employing
a “trust-but-verify” approach that enables applications to independently verify the
integrity of data published by each user, and do so as often as necessary. In the
case of crowd-sourced sensing applications, the published data is a location and
8associated sensory information; in the case of online games, it is the player’s next
move; and in the spam prevention scenario, it is the solution of a puzzle.
The idea behind the trust-but-verify approach is to first, identify or define the
data generation functions executed by users, clients, or data sources to create and
publish data, and then, enable the application or data consumer to verify that
those data generation functions were correctly executed. The challenge is in build-
ing verification methods that satisfy the constraints of individual applications. For
example, we will see in Chapter 4 that privacy-preserving crowd-sourced sensing
applications must verify the integrity of data source locations without being pro-
vided with those locations.
Unlike anomaly detection (Section 1.2), the trust-but-verify approach enables
applications to independently verify the integrity of data published by each user.
Unlike device monitoring (Section 1.2), the trust-but-verify approach does not re-
quire intrusive scanners to ensure that generation functions are correctly executed.
It also enables efficient integrity checking by allowing the application to verify less
information from a participant it trusts more, and verify more information from a
participant it trusts less. The details of the trust-but-verify approach have been
presented in Chapter 2.
Applying, the trust-but-verify principles to guarantee the integrity of user-
generated content in crowd-sourced sensing, online gaming, spam prevention sys-
tems have resulted in the following contributions:
• In Chapter 3 we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of the
Trusted Sensing Peripheral (TSP): a sensing device with an embedded trusted-
third-party that attests to the validity of the generated sensory information.
• In Chapter 4 we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of Loca-
tionProof, a protocol that enables TSP-based crowd-sourced location sensors
to prove the integrity of locations without revealing those locations.
9• In Chapter 5, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of
SpotCheck, a system for detecting information exposure cheats in online
games.
• In Chapter 6, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of Meta-
CAPTCHA, an effective spam prevention system for online messaging ap-
plications based on the reusable-proof-of-work approach. MetaCAPTCHA
allows the “work” issued to a user’s device be any generic computation.
1.4 THESIS STATEMENT
The trust-but-verify approach allows online applications that encourage open par-
ticipation to
• independently determine the integrity of data published by each participant
• obtain the desired level of integrity guarantee
• non-intrusively establish data integrity
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Chapter 2
THE TRUST-BUT-VERIFY APPROACH
As shown in Figure 2.1, the trust-but-verify approach is applicable to a system
in which a set of data sources S = s1, ..., sn periodically send the content they
generate to a data consumer C. The sources are usually user devices and the
consumer is usually the application interested in the data produced by the sources.
At any given time instant t, a source i uses input xi,t to generate content yi,t =
f(xi,t). The input xi,t may be provided by the user or obtained directly from the
environment: for example, in crowd-sourced location sensing applications, sources
publish coordinates that are generated using GPS satellite signals present in the
environment. The generated content yi,t may further be aggregated locally by
the source and globally by an aggregator A before finally reaching a consumer C.
At a given time t, local aggregation involves combining past and current content
{yi,tp : tp ≤ t} while global aggregation combines content {yu,t : su ∈ S} generated
by multiple sources.
Ultimately, the consumer C would like to determine with some confidence that
the received aggregate zt is correct. Here, correctness implies that each input
xi,t was processed in order using only the functions f(·), f1(·), and f2(·); together
called the data generation functions. The goal then, is to develop a data verification
function that allows C to determine if the data generation functions were faithfully
executed over the inputs.
If the data sources and aggregators are trustworthy, there would be no need
for a verification function; C could simply assume that zt is correct. However, C
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Figure 2.1: The trust-but-verify system model. Data sources S = s1, ..., sn are gen-
erating and publishing data to a consumer C. The generated data may optionally
be aggregated locally with past data or globally, by an aggregator A, with data
from other sources. The goal of the trust-but-verify approach is to provide C with
a way to determine if the inputs to the sources were indeed processed in order by
the functions f(·), f1(·), and f2(·) (together called the data generation functions).
may not always have a way to establish a basis of trust [7]: for example, in crowd-
sourced sensing applications, people volunteer to collect and publish data using
personally owned mobile devices. In this scenario, the consumer has no way of
knowing if those mobile devices are faithfully processing inputs sensed from their
immediate environment. The goal of this work is to provide the data consumer C
with tools to verify the correctness of received aggregate zt, thereby allowing C to
cultivate trust in the sources and aggregators that contributed to computing zt.
More specifically, upon receiving zt, C may challenge the sources and aggregators
to prove its correctness. The sources and aggregators then collectively send back a
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set of responses Rt that allows C to verify the correctness of zt. A trivial solution is
for each source i to provide C with input xi,t, i.e. Rt = {xi,t : si ∈ S}. C can then
independently compute a value z using the generation functions f(·), f1(·), and
f2(·) over respective subsets of Rt and check if it matches zt. The problem with this
approach is that it is not generally applicable. Consider again, our crowd-sourced
location-sensing example: here, the sources have no way of sending the analog
GPS satellite signals they sensed in their immediate environment. Thus, the set
of responses Rt and the verification method must be tailored to each application.
Notice that the trust-but-verify approach does not attempt to establish the au-
thenticity of input xi,t, it attempts only to determine if xi,t is faithfully processed
at each intermediate step.
Now, assuming that a verification procedure has been defined, the data con-
sumer may choose to check the integrity of aggregate zt during only a subset of
time instances {t : tbegin ≤ t ≤ tcurr} where tbegin represents the time data collec-
tion began and tcurr represents the current time. How often a consumer checks
the integrity of an aggregate is called the consumer’s verification strategy . Pick-
ing a strategy will depend on a trade-off between how much unchecked data the
consumer can tolerate and the amount of computational resources it can devote
to integrity checking. The advantage of the trust-but-verify approach is that a
consumer can pick a strategy.
Once a consumer picks a strategy, it can estimate the amount of time before a
fabricated aggregate is detected using the discrete negative binomial distribution.
The discrete negative binomial distribution NB(r, p) describes the probability of
the number of “successes” in a sequence of binomial trials before r “failures” occur.
The success and failure probabilities in any given trial are p and 1−p respectively.
If we assume that received data zt is being corrupted with probability q and that
the consumer is checking the integrity of zt with probability p, then the probability
of detecting a corrupt zt during time instant t is pq. Now, in the context of the
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negative binomial distribution, “success” can be represented by the event, “not
detecting a corrupt zt”, and “failure” can be represented by the event, “detecting
a corrupt zt”. Thus, the success and failure probabilities in any time instant
t are 1 − pq and pq respectively. Also, since we are interested in the number of
“successes” before the first “failure”, the parameter r = 1. Given these distribution
parameters, the expected number of time instants before the first corrupt zt is
detected can be written as:
1− pq
pq
Figure 2.2 shows the expected number of time instants before detecting a cor-
rupt zt given q ∈ Q, Q = {0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}, and .01 ≤ p ≤ .99. We can see that
when checking 20% of the time (p = 0.2), the consumer is expected to detect a
corrupt zt within 7 to 24 time instants given that q ∈ Q.
Figure 2.2: Expected number of time instances before a corrupt zt is detected
for the first time. Here, the zt is being corrupted with probabilities q ∈ Q, Q =
{0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}, and checked with probabilities .01 ≤ p ≤ .99 respectively.
In the following chapters, we explain how the trust-but-verify approach can be
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used to determine the correctness of data received from sources and aggregators
in different applications.
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Chapter 3
HIGH-INTEGRITY CROWD-SOURCED SENSING
Crowd-sourced sensing systems allow people to voluntarily contribute sensed in-
formation (e.g. location, images, audio) to Internet portals like SensorMap [93]
using a personal sensing device [43]. These systems have the potential to pro-
vide unprecedented insight into our local environment because data is collected
everywhere people are. For example, Paulos et al. [96] conducted a field study
in Accra, Ghana where they retrofitted seven taxis with pollution sensors that
constantly collected air quality information en route. The proliferation of increas-
ingly connected, programmable, and sensor-rich mobile platforms like smartphones
constantly fuels the growth of crowd-sourced sensing applications. Noteworthy ex-
amples include traffic, health, and safety monitoring; citizen science initiatives;
and personal environmental impact reporting [31, 131, 106, 96]
This use of existing mobile infrastructure makes crowd-sourced sensing cheaper
to deploy than dedicated sensor networks. Data collected from such systems can
improve understanding of local environments, help shape public policy or facilitate
new scientific research. However, government and researchers alike will be reluctant
to use the data if they cannot trust its integrity.
This lack of trust would be unfounded if sensed data were infeasible to fab-
ricate, but that is not the case. Consider a crowd-sourced traffic navigation sys-
tem like Waze [143]. Participants of Waze download a client application on their
smart phones that activates the phone’s internal GPS receiver, and periodically re-
ports their GPS coordinates to Waze. With sufficient user participation, Waze can
provide optimal routes to destinations based on the real-time traffic information
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learned from participants. A malicious participant could easily fool Waze by mod-
ifying the client application to publish false hazards in order to score points. He
could launch multiple emulated smart phones on resource-abundant hardware and
submit random GPS coordinates. We classify the former as a software attack and
the latter as a Sybil attack [37]. The aforementioned attacks are possible mainly
because the sensing devices (e.g. smart phones) are under autonomous control of
the participants. Although our example highlights the GPS sensor, software and
Sybil attacks are applicable to any of the phone’s sensors.
3.1 APPLYING THE TRUST-BUT-VERIFY APPROACH
We address software and Sybil attacks by enabling crowd-sourced sensing applica-
tions to establish the integrity of the sensory information received from the partici-
pants. Sensory information has integrity if it was captured by appropriate physical
sensors that actually witnessed the phenomenon. This chapter establishes this fact
by applying the trust-but-verify approach. First, we must identify the data to ver-
ify: in this case, it is the output of the sensors. Next, the generation functions
for that data must be identified: in crowd-sourced sensing applications, these are
the functions in the device driver and sensing platform that together collect data
from the environment. The final step is to develop a verification function that
allows the application to determine that the generation functions were faithfully
executed. The approach we use here, is to build a trustworthy sensing platform
that can attest to the integrity of the software running on it. The attestation is
like a signature, that when verified by a remote party, guarantees that the platform
was running a certain unmodified version of software. Trust in the platform, in
turn, induces trust in the faithful execution of the generation functions. Sections
3.3 – 3.6 describe how to build this trustworthy sensing platform.
Applications may also require that trustworthy sensing platforms aggregate
their data locally before publishing it. In this case, the aggregation function is an
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additional generation function whose faithful execution must be guaranteed by the
trust-but-verify approach. We describe how this is done in Section 4.6.
3.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
This chapter presents a trusted-hardware based sensing platform to combat the
above attacks, enabling crowd-sourced collection of high-integrity raw or aggregate
data. Its contributions are:
• The design and implementation of a Trusted Sensing Peripheral (TSP). The
TSP is a sensing platform that consists of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
[134] and hardware sensors. Our goal is to make the TSP economically
infeasible to emulate or modify without being detected. The TPM facilitates
this by attesting to the authenticity and integrity of the TSP as well as the
sensor data. Successfully verified attestations prove to a data receiver, such
as an online portal, that the data is indeed authentic and was not altered,
either by the TSP or during transit. Experiments show that the TSP is very
energy efficient: it has a projected battery life of over 80 days when collecting,
attesting, and transmitting a temperature sample every 30 seconds.
• STAP: an efficient, end-to-end, high-integrity, data aggregation protocol for
crowd-sourced sensing. The TSP publishes sensor data to an online portal
via the participant’s mobile device acting as a forwarding proxy. To reduce
the energy expended in transmitting raw data, and the processing overhead
at the portal, the mobile proxy could aggregate the TSP’s raw data before
forwarding it. But, a malicious proxy could fabricate the aggregates instead
of actually computing them from the TSP’s raw trusted data. The Secure
Tasking and Aggregation Protocol (STAP) modeled on a bit-commitment
scheme [27, 16], uses a pseudo-random challenge-response mechanism that
allows a portal to detect a lying proxy. By randomly challenging only 20%
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of the aggregates, the portal can detect a lying proxy within the first six false
aggregates received.
• A high-integrity platform that augments legacy mobile devices with trustwor-
thy sensing. The Trusted Sensing Peripheral (TSP) enables legacy untrust-
worthy mobile devices to produce trusted data. Section 3.5.2 discusses chal-
lenges to making contemporary sensing-capable phones trustworthy: namely
the absence of proper hardware support, distrust in trusted hardware, and
growing exposure to remote attacks. Besides trustworthy sensing, the TSP
provides greater sensing modalities than commodity mobile devices.
3.3 SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
As Figure 3.1 shows, the TSP collects sensor data, has the TPM sign it, and
forwards it to the mobile proxy, which either aggregates the raw data or forwards
it as is. Adversaries may compromise either the TSP, or the mobile proxy.
Figure 3.1: The TSP publishes data via the participant’s mobile device, which can
then process the data, or forward it as is.
In the context of the trust-but-verify approach, the TSP is the data source, the
mobile proxy is the local aggregator, and the portal is the data consumer. The
generation functions include those on the TSP that perform the sensing (e.g. func-
tions in the sensing device drivers) and any data aggregation functions executed
by the mobile proxy.
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3.3.1 Threats to the TSP
Our goal is to prevent or detect software and Sybil attacks against the TSP, to
ensure that data reported to the portal was not modified in unintended ways by
the TSP software, and did not originate from emulated, simulated, or fake devices.
We considered the following specific threats:
• Software modification. This refers to any modification of the TSP firmware.
It can happen remotely or with physical access to the TSP. An adversary
that gains control of the firmware can modify the included device drivers to
alter sensor data or the time when it is published.
• Masquerading. The adversary can have a device that either pretends to be a
legitimate TSP, or creates multiple emulated or simulated TSPs, each called
a Sybil. The Sybil attack [37] will be successful if the system cannot detect
or prevent the creation of a Sybil.
• Communication Integrity Compromise. A man-in-the-middle can inject, mod-
ify, drop, or replay messages in transit between the TSP and the portal. A
successful attack on communication integrity can result in the publication of
false, corrupt or stale data.
3.3.2 Threats to the Mobile Proxy
The participant’s mobile device serves either as a forwarding proxy for raw data
originating from the TSP, or as a data aggregating proxy when processing the raw
data before sending it to the portal. A malicious participant may modify its mobile
proxy to compromise the integrity of published data. The proxy is not trusted by
the portal or the TSP in any role and poses the following threats to data integrity:
• Communications compromise. The threats posed by a compromised forward-
ing proxy are the same as threats to communication integrity between the
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TSP and the portal. Addressing communication integrity threats simultane-
ously addresses threats from a malicious proxy.
• Malicious data aggregation. When a compromised mobile proxy functions
as a data aggregating proxy, it can fake the aggregate values, drop them, or
inject any new ones. In this scenario, the portal must be able to detect and
reject data from the malicious proxy.
3.3.3 Threats not Addressed
Although we address some of the most challenging threats to data integrity in
crowd-sourced sensing, the following threats, although important, have not been
addressed:
• Availability. A remote adversary may force the TSP or proxy to continuously
receive messages, depleting their battery [122]. Or the mobile proxy may drop
all communications between the TSP and the portal. Such forms of Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks are currently not addressed.
• Confidentiality. We primarily address data integrity in crowd-sourced sens-
ing, as such, we rely on other components to provide confidentiality. For
example, the channel between the TSP and the mobile proxy (see Figure
3.1) can be secured using Bluetooth’s security features.
• Physical Data Poisoning. A participating adversary may alter the very phe-
nomenon being sensed. For example, he could collude with others to drive
slowly, thus, depicting congestion. It is important to note that the TSP ne-
cessitates physical tampering of the phenomenon to publish fabricated data,
as opposed to simple software modification to do the same. We believe this
greatly raises the bar for data poisoning attacks.
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• Hardware attacks on the TPM. Since the TPM is the root of trust for our
approach, we assume that it is tamper-proof as claimed, not compromised,
and functioning as expected. This is a reasonable assumption given that
simple yet effective hardware attacks on the TPM, like the timing and reset
attacks have already been addressed [13, 133]. Furthermore, the most recent
attack involving extraction of an obsolete TPM’s “burned-in” private key
took specialized skills, around six months, and costly equipment worth about
200,000 USD [129]!
3.4 THE TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE
As we discuss in Section 3.5, the TPM is the root of trust for data authenticity and
platform integrity assurance provided by the TSP. Trust in the TPM stems from
internationally recognized common criteria standards [127]. The TPM is a tamper-
proof secure co-processor that enables trusted computing principles on commodity
computing platforms. It is housed on the host platform and provides tamper-proof
storage for cryptographic keying material, and platform configuration information.
Additionally, it can digitally sign and report the securely stored configuration
information, thus indirectly attesting to the integrity of the platform. Further,
since the digital signatures are computed using keys protected from extraction, any
signed information from the TPM can be considered authentic once the signature
is verified.
A TPM is associated with several credentials, each containing information re-
garding the TPM or its associated platform, and digitally signed by the entity
issuing the credentials. References to the various TPM credentials (in the form
of message digests) along with the public portion of the TPM’s RSA signing key
(AIKpub: Attestation Identity Key) are included in a final attestation identity
credential that is then signed by a trusted certificate authority. Once presented
to remote entities, the successful verification of the attestation identity credential
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proves that the specified platform indeed contains a certified TPM and that any
digital signatures performed by that TPM (using AIKpriv) can be verified using
the included public signing key. Since the corresponding private key is securely
created, stored, and protected from extraction by the TPM itself, the TPM’s sig-
nature cannot be repudiated.
The TPM also provides load-time platform integrity verification via its platform
attestation feature. However, run-time changes to the platform cannot be directly
captured by the TPM. Section 3.5.2 discusses the design of our Trusted Sensing
Peripheral (TSP) that inherently resists run-time software attacks. Thus, trust in
the run-time state along with trust in the initial platform configuration transitively
induces trust in the load-time state of the platform, allowing the TSP to use the
TPM solely as a signing authority.
3.5 DESIGN
In this section, we describe the Trusted Sensing Peripheral (TSP) and the Secure
Tasking and data Aggregation Protocol (STAP).
3.5.1 Design Assumptions
We assume that the online portal has the TPM’s attestation identity credentials
that contain its public Attestation Identity Key AIKpub, used to verify the TPM’s
signature. For STAP, we assume a secure transmission channel (e.g. the Secure
Sockets Library (SSL)) between the proxy and the portal, and that the portal has
a strong pseudo-random number generator. Our protocol’s security depends on the
assumption that a malicious proxy cannot reliably predict the sequence of random
numbers generated by the portal.
23
3.5.2 Design Rationale
Designing a high-integrity sensing platform is not trivial. Especially, when the
platform can potentially be in the physical possession of an adversary. This, by-
definition, is the case with crowd-sourced sensing: participants carry mobile plat-
forms with built-in sensors that upload data to an online portal. Although most
participants may be honest, one can not ignore that malicious participants may
poison the data integrity.
At the least, the portal must be able to detect sensory data tampering, or
the sensing platform must be able to prevent it entirely. Since participation in
crowd-sourced sensing is voluntary, people may register at any time with private
heterogeneous sensing devices. Thus, the system must be able to detect fake
devices or prevent their participation.
Cryptographic techniques that detect data tampering across a communication
channel (e.g. message digests) work only if the communicating parties have a vested
interest in protecting the transmitted data. However, in crowd-sourced sensing,
one of the parties, namely the data producer, could very well be the adversary,
making it very hard for the portal to discover if fabricated data was being protected
in the first place.
The portal could compare multiple data values produced in the same region and
reject the outliers. However, as discussed later in Section 3.9, this method may be
effective at detecting outliers, but is counter to the objective of an adversary who
actually wants to avoid detection. Consider again, the example of an adversary
that emulates multiple distinct mobile devices and publishes GPS data to make a
quiet neighborhood street appear congested. This situation will hardly appear to
the system as outlying activity. Furthermore, since the portal cannot distinguish
between real and emulated platforms, this sort of software collusion attack using
multiple Sybil (or fake) identities will go undetected. Other issues with this ap-
proach are the need for redundant data sources in any region, and different outlier
24
detection mechanisms depending on the type of data being collected.
Consequently, our design takes the prevention approach. Here, the sensing
platform itself prevents any modification to the sensed data. We use a trusted
third-party housed on the platform to vouch for the integrity of all the software
running on it. If the portal cannot verify the presence of a trusted third-party
on the remote sensing platform, it can choose not to trust the data emanating
from it. Since the presence of the trusted third-party cannot be cloned or faked,
it is impossible for a sensing platform to appear trustworthy when its not. Our
trusted third-party housed on the sensing platform is the TPM. It forms the root of
trust for data and platform integrity assurances provided by the associated sensing
platform.
Recall that the sensing platform in crowd-sourced sensing systems is usually
the participant’s mobile device, which is assumed to already have existing sensing
capabilities (e.g. GPS, accelerometer, microphone). However, our approach was
to build a separate “closed box” high-integrity sensing platform we now call the
Trusted Sensing Peripheral (TSP). Several factors motivated this approach:
• As Garfinkel et al. stated in their work on a trusted virtualization platform
called Terra [50], “The security benefits of starting from scratch on a “closed
box” special-purpose platform can be significant”. They believed, like us,
that an opaque special-purpose platform can more easily protect the integrity
of its contents.
• Providing “closed box” semantics on most commodity mobile devices is not
possible due to the lack of required hardware support and effective protection
of software from run-time attacks. Terra [50] provides load-time application
integrity guarantees using the TPM, and strong isolation by running it inside
a virtual machine managed by a Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor. However,
we are not aware of any existing commodity mobile devices equipped with
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TPM chips. Further, Terra does not protect software from run-time attacks
by malicious device drivers that have access to the DMA controller. Another
system proposed by McCune et al. [82], called Flicker, provides a secure
execution environment for a portion of an application’s logic. Besides the
need for a TPM, this approach also requires additional hardware support
(like the SKINIT instruction found on certain AMD processors [8], or the
GETSEC+SENTER instructions on certain Intel processors [63]) to setup
the secure execution environment. Flicker provides protection from DMA
attacks, and strong isolation by disabling all interrupts and debugging sup-
port. However, regardless of hardware support, certain practical limitations
remain. Flicker requires that the OS and all associated tasks be suspended
during the time the secure execution environment is active. Given the high
overhead of the SKINIT instruction and the required TPM operation on a
desktop (912.6 msec on a 2.2 GHz AMD Athlon 64-bit Dual Core processor),
it is safe to assume, for now at least, that the situation will be worse on a
mobile platform with users frustratingly noticing their mobile device freeze
periodically to allow secure sensing activities to take place.
• Existing mobile devices with sensing capabilities (e.g. smart phones) are
as exposed and vulnerable as today’s desktops. Our always-on Internet-
connected smart phones are already at risk of being usurped by active botnets
[72]. A “closed box” sensing platform, such as one without a connection
to the Internet, will make remote attacks on sensory data integrity more
challenging.
• Decoupling trustworthy sensing from trusted computing will make trustwor-
thy sensing less invasive and encourage its adoption. Features provided by
trusted computing, like TPM-based platform attestation, have been the topic
of much debate. Some like Ross Anderson and Bruce Schneier have been
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vocal critics and consider it to be an invasive technology that encourages
software monopolies, facilitates DRM, and compromises privacy [23, 109].
For example, since it is necessary to verify the integrity of all software com-
ponents on a platform to provide integrity assurances about a single one
[110], the verifier would effectively know all about the platform’s OS and ap-
plication configuration. Thus, the TPM’s platform attestation feature may
inadvertently pose a threat to privacy.
• A separate trustworthy sensing device, like our TSP, could expand sensing
capabilities. Mobile devices, like smart phones are equipped with only those
sensors that help their functionality (e.g. GPS, microphone, accelerometer).
However, some crowd-sourced sensing applications may require more special-
ized sensors, such as smog, dust, or chemical pollutant sensors to measure air
quality. Furthermore, even mobile devices without any sensing capabilities
could help produce trustworthy sensor data.
3.5.3 TSP Architecture
Figure 3.1 shows the TSP architecture, consisting of a TPM-capable hardware plat-
form with attached sensors. A Bluetooth module allows the TSP to communicate
with an array of mobile devices supporting the technology.
We achieve “closed-box” semantics on the TSP by building it using a special-
purpose Modified Harvard-architecture sensing platform, and permanently dis-
abling features that may compromise its software integrity. It is widely known,
that run-time attacks exploiting memory-related vulnerabilities with the intent of
modifying program instructions, have little or no chance of success on such plat-
forms [47]. Such platforms provide strong physical isolation between executable
instructions in program memory, and information in data memory. The program
memory on such devices is read-only, and the program counter is not allowed to
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refer to addresses in data memory. Consequently, program instructions can neither
be changed, nor be executed from data memory at run-time. All usual methods
to reprogram the TSP — physical or remote — are disabled permanently. Normal
communication methods, like the radio, are also disabled. The only connection
between the TSP and the outside world is via a Bluetooth channel. To enable
genuine upgrades, we use the existing over-the-air self-reprogramming mechanism
supported by the TSP. However, instead of receiving the firmware image over the
radio channel, we receive it over Bluetooth. These protections are sufficient to
prevent the TSP from a recent and only known permanent code injection attack
on a Modified Harvard-architecture platform [47].
Given the above protections in place, a physical or remote adversary will not
be able to change the pre-programmed firmware on the TSP. Consequently, the
on-board TPM need only attest to a firmware version identifier on the device when
challenged by a remote entity. Any data sensed by the TSP is signed by the TPM
to guarantee its authenticity and integrity. Trust in the data is induced via trust
in the platform integrity.
28
F
ig
u
re
3.
2:
S
ec
u
re
T
as
k
in
g
an
d
D
at
a
A
gg
re
ga
ti
on
P
ro
to
co
l
(S
T
A
P
)
29
3.5.4 Secure Tasking and Aggregation
Secure tasking involves verifying that the given platform has a TPM (see Sec-
tion 3.4), then challenging it to produce a TPM attestation of the platform’s
firmware, then verifying the attestation is authentic and correctly represents the
TSP firmware (e.g. comparing the respective message digests), and finally schedul-
ing the TSP to collect, sign, and send data from a subset of its sensors at regular
intervals.
To save energy required for data transmissions and to help reduce processing
overhead at the portal, the data producer’s mobile device (the mobile proxy) may
choose to aggregate the raw data from the TSP before forwarding it to the portal.
For example, instead of sending raw GPS coordinates from the TSP every 30
seconds, the mobile proxy may send a coarser region covered by those coordinates
every five minutes.
We have developed STAP (Figure 3.2), a protocol that allows the portal to
detect if the untrusted mobile proxy is fabricating the aggregates, as opposed to
computing them using the TSP’s signed raw data. To detect a lying proxy, the
portal must know the aggregation function in advance. This function is therefore
the generation and verification function in the trust-but-verify approach. Then,
during the course of receiving data, the portal pseudo-randomly requests the mobile
proxy for the latest window of signed raw data used to compute the just received
aggregate (the proxy needs to buffer this data). When the portal receives the raw
data from the mobile proxy, it verifies that the TSP signed them, then recomputes
the aggregate using the aggregation function, and finally compares the computed
aggregate with the one already sent. If the comparison fails, the portal can choose
to reject further transmissions from this lying proxy. This is similar to the concept
of bit-commitment introduced by Chaum et al. [27] where one commits to a value
before it is checked for correctness.
The pseudo-random challenge forces the mobile proxy to guess when it is safe
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to fabricate an aggregate. Eventually, a lying proxy will guess wrong and get
caught. Lying more only causes the proxy to be detected faster and lying less only
delays that outcome. The following equation represents the expected number of
aggregates E(n) a portal accepts, when challenging aggregates with probability q,
before detecting a proxy lying with probability p.
E(n) =
∞∑
n=1
n× (1− pq)n−1 × pq (3.1)
We evaluate STAP in Section 5.9 and show that the experimental results closely
match the analytical one above.
3.6 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we discuss our TSP prototype and the implementation of STAP.
3.6.1 Trusted Sensing Peripheral (TSP)
We use the secFleck [60] as the foundation of the TSP. The secFleck is the portion
of the TSP consisting of the Atmel TPM chip (based on v1.2 of the Trusted
Computing Group specification [132]), and the Fleck sensor board (see Figure
3.3).
Figure 3.3: Trusted Sensing Peripheral with a Bluetooth and GPS module.
The Fleck is a sensing platform with 8 KB of memory and an 8 MHz Atmega
micro controller [117]. It houses the TPM module, and is extensible with various
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sensors. The TSP firmware, including the FleckOS, sensor device drivers, and our
application, runs on the Fleck hardware.
Figure 3.3 shows the TSP. Attached to it, is a Parani-ESD Bluetooth module.
The mobile proxy application communicates with the TSP using a local, inter-
mediary Python relay service called foslisten. foslisten communicates locally
using TCP sockets, while with the TSP, it uses a serial-over-Bluetooth channel
(Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Data producers on the mobile proxy communicate with the TSP via a
Python relay service called ’foslisten’.
3.6.2 Online Portal
The online portal is responsible for tasking the TSP, verifying the TSP’s platform
integrity and the integrity of any data received from it, requesting the mobile proxy
to aggregate data if necessary, and pseudo-randomly challenging the mobile proxy
to prove its trustworthiness when aggregated data is received. The portal runs
as a standard multi-threaded TCP server on a 2.2 GHz Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo
platform with 1.9 GB of memory running Linux kernel version 2.6.32.10.
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3.6.3 Mobile Proxy
The service running on the mobile proxy is responsible for receiving a task from the
portal, in turn tasking the TSP via the Bluetooth channel using our custom RPC
protocol, retrieving data from the TSP, and forwarding that data to the portal.
The mobile proxy is a Nokia N800 tablet with 128 MB of memory running Linux
kernel version 2.6.21 on an ARMv6 processor. Although we use the N800, a widely
popular tablet, our work is applicable to any smart phone or tablet device.
3.6.4 Secure Tasking and Aggregation
The details of STAP are shown in Figure 3.2. Here, we limit our discussion to
how the TSP is tasked. The portal first sends a task description [S, c, t, f ] to the
mobile proxy, where, S is the set of sensors to collect data from, c is the number
of data samples to collect, and t is the time (in seconds) within which to collect
the c samples (sampling interval is thus t/c seconds). S is expressed using a 16-bit
mask, allowing sixteen sensors to be tasked simultaneously with the same sampling
interval. Each set of data samples are reported in an attested response message
signed using AIKpriv (see Figure 3.4), and can be verified by the portal using
AIKpub. A mobile proxy modifying the task description will be detected when the
portal verifies the one echoed back by the TSP in the first attested response.
3.7 EVALUATION
We first evaluate the performance of the TSP and then evaluate STAP in Section
3.7.2.
3.7.1 TSP Performance
We analyze the performance of the TSP in terms of time and energy required to
perform and transmit data attestations. Then, we discuss other costs involved in
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building the TSP: code size, memory usage, and monetary cost. The TSP runs
on three 1.5 V batteries with a 2500 mAh capacity each and is configured with
two sensors: an on-board temperature sensor, and an attached GPS sensor (Figure
3.3).
Timing Measurements
The TSP is made to repeatedly perform and return forty attestations, each over a
set of temperature data samples varying in size from 2 to 92 bytes at 10 byte inter-
vals. Average time spent performing attestations, along with the 95% confidence
interval, is shown in Table 3.1. The small confidence interval due to the dominant
RSA signature operation that is always performed over a fixed size SHA-1 digest
of the data. Table 3.1 also shows the average transmission time of the signed data
samples. As we can see, the TSP can only sample, attest, and report data at
intervals greater than ≈ 2 seconds. This lower limit on sampling and reporting is
more than acceptable for existing crowd-sourced sensing systems, most of which,
require data samples less frequently than that [62, 106, 42, 9].
Task Compute Time Transmit Time
(sec) (sec)
Single
Attestation 1.72 (± 0.01) 0.3 (± 0.1)
Table 3.1: Average time required to perform and transmit an attestation.
Energy Measurements
We measured the TSP’s current draw in different energy states using an oscilloscope
with an internal resistance of 10MΩ across a 1Ω resistor placed in series with the
TSP. Table 3.2 shows the average current drawn by the TSP while it was idle,
performing attestations, and performing transmissions.
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Energy State Current Draw
Idle 80 µA
Attesting 50 mA
Transmitting 42 mA
Table 3.2: Average current drawn in various TSP energy states.
Using the timing and current draw measurements, we computed the energy
consumed by the TSP while collecting, attesting and transmitting a 2 byte sample
of data at various intervals. Figure 3.5(b) compares energy consumption of the
TSP with the TPM, without any security, and when the TPM’s operations are
performed in software [60]. Hardware attestations end up being half as expensive
as those performed in software, because, although they draw more current, they
can be computed much faster. However, the TPM requires three times more energy
than if there were no security at all.
We also computed an estimate of the TSP’s battery life. Figure 3.5(a) shows
that when tasked with sampling, attesting, and transmitting a 2 byte sample every
30 seconds and remaining idle in-between, the TSP can achieve a battery life of
over 80 days. This is quite sufficient for crowd-sourced sensing, where participants
will carry and eventually recharge these platforms. Also, notice that battery life
is nearly double than when all security is in software.
Other Costs
Figure 3.6 compares compiled code sizes of various software components running on
the TSP. The code size of our application is smaller than both the TPM library and
the FleckOS. Memory (RAM) used by the firmware is approximately 4.2 KBytes,
which is a little over half the available memory (8 KBytes) on the current version
of the Fleck. Monetary costs involved are currently high: the cost of the TSP
hardware is approximately 300 USD. The TPM chip itself is inexpensive, about 6
35
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
X: 30
Y: 80.19
Sampling Interval(s)
Ba
tte
ry
 L
ife
 (D
ay
s)
No Security
Software RSA
TPM RSA
(a) TSP battery life.
No Security Fleck Software RSA Fleck TPM RSA
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
En
er
gy
 U
sa
ge
 (J
ou
le
s/
Sa
m
pl
e
Attestation
Transmission
(b) TSP energy usage.
Figure 3.5: Battery life and energy usage of the TSP.
USD when purchased in large quantities (≥ 1000).These monetary costs are higher
due to the limited scale at which our TSP is currently produced; with economies
of scale we believe that the cost could be brought down to lower than 50 USD.
3.7.2 Secure Tasking and Aggregation Protocol
We conducted experiments to answer the following questions about our protocol:
1) How many fabricated aggregate values are accepted by the portal before a lying
mobile proxy is detected? 2) How long does it take for the portal to find a lying
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Figure 3.6: Compiled code size comparison of various software components on the
TSP.
proxy? and, 3) What is the overhead of detection?
In each experiment, the mobile proxy is configured to randomly fabricate (or
lie about) an aggregate with probability ranging between 1/10 to 1/2 (or 10%
to 50% of aggregates). Here, fabrication involves adding a random number be-
tween 1 and 10 to the result of the aggregation function. The online portal then
pseudo-randomly challenges the integrity of a received aggregate with the same
probabilities. Aggregations are performed on every 10 two-byte samples of tem-
perature data. The aggregation function f performed by the proxy is a mean of
those samples. An experiment continues until the portal detects the first fabri-
cated aggregate value. When necessary for clarity, we omit data points that don’t
add significantly to the information conveyed by the graphs.
Figure 3.7(a) shows that the portal can quickly and efficiently detect a lying
proxy. While pseudo-randomly challenging only 20% of the aggregates, the mali-
cious proxy is detected within the first six fabrications received — no matter how
much it lies. The advantage of challenging more than 20% of the aggregates is not
significant, thus, this threshold reasonably trades off the integrity of aggregates
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(a) Damage to data integrity
(b) Overhead of detection (c) Aggregates accepted before detection
Figure 3.7: Performance of the secure aggregation protocol STAP
with the overhead of challenging.
Figure 3.7(c) shows how long it takes the portal to detect the malicious proxy in
terms of the number of aggregates (false or otherwise) accepted before detection.
Not surprisingly, the less a proxy lies the longer it takes to detect it. We also
plotted Equation (5.1) with the portal’s checking probability q set to 1/5 (or 20%
of the aggregates). It can be seen that the analytical plot is within the confidence
intervals of the experimental one. Notice also, the large drop in aggregates accepted
when challenging 20%, rather than 10% of them.
Figure 3.7(b) shows the detection overhead in terms of the number of challenges
issued before detecting a lying proxy. Surprisingly, the overhead largely depends
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only on how often the proxy lies. Figure 3.7(c) provides an intuitive explanation:
although the number of aggregates accepted before detection varies significantly,
the number of challenges issued does not. This result works in favor of the portal,
which can now minimize the number of challenges based on factors like reducing
the number of fabrications accepted.
3.8 THREAT ANALYSIS
We now revisit our threat model and describe how our system addresses those
threats to the TSP and mobile proxy.
3.8.1 Threats to the TSP
A majority of the threats are addressed as a consequence of the TPM’s special
capabilities, namely, a sealed private key and the property of being infeasible to
replicate.
• Software modification. Such attacks are mitigated by building the TSP using
a modified harvard-architecture based platform that provides strict isolation
between program and data memory, and permanently disabling all methods
that can possibly alter the TSP’s firmware.
• Masquerading. The TPM’s sealed private key ties the identity of the TSP
(represented by that key) with the hardware platform. Since the TPM cannot
be cloned, and its private key cannot be extracted, the adversary has no way
to masquerade as a TSP.
• Communications Compromise. The portal can detect modification or in-
jection of data because an adversary without the TSP cannot fabricate its
signatures. Replay attacks can be detected because each data sample gener-
ated by the TSP has an incremental sequence number.
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3.8.2 Threats to the Mobile Proxy
The portal uses STAP to detect a mobile proxy fabricating aggregates. The key
idea is that a mobile proxy commits to the aggregate value by the very act of
sending it to the portal. The portal then pseudo-randomly verifies the integrity of
that commitment. A lying mobile proxy may be able to publish some fabricated
aggregates (see Figure 3.7(a)), but will eventually get caught.
3.9 RELATED WORK
Existing research on crowd-sourced sensing does not address the data integrity
problem the way we define it, namely, “How can a data portal — receiving data
from sensors not under its control — trust that the data is a true representation
of the real-world phenomenon being sensed?”.
Research on traditional sensing, however, does suggest some approaches that
might be adapted to solving the above problem. For example, a reputation-based
framework implemented at the portal could identify and ignore data from sources
with a low reputation [48]. A source is assigned a low reputation as long as it
generates outlying data samples when compared to others in its neighborhood. The
reputation is actually assigned by neighboring sensors that also sense similar data.
Even though this network architecture may not be practical for highly mobile crowd
sensors, it also does not provide protection from Sybil attacks, where an adversary
could create any number of virtual sources and use them to artificially raise a
given source’s reputation. A reputation based system will also be more effective in
detecting faulty sources than malicious ones, reason being, malicious sources will
try to avoid detection by publishing fabricated, but not necessarily outlying data
[48]. Among other issues, reputation based frameworks require redundant sources
of data to detect outliers, and are specific to the type of data being collected.
Another approach, also from traditional sensing, involves filtering fabricated
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or anomalous data that is injected into the sensor network [150]. Data that at
least t + 1 local sensors don’t agree on, or data coming from unauthentic sen-
sors is considered fabricated. The system is thus resilient to adversaries that have
compromised at most t sensor nodes. Since each sensor in the network can be
authenticated, the sensor network is resilient to Sybil attacks. However, the as-
sumption is that each sensor node already shares a key with the authenticator (the
base station). This assumption might be realistic for traditional sensor networks,
but is not realistic for crowd-sourced sensing systems where the data portals and
data producers (participants from the crowd) are different autonomous entities.
It would be unreasonable to expect that every potential data portal has a preex-
isting secret with every potential data producer. The Sybil attack, could thus be
launched by a data producer during the time a shared secret is established with
a new data portal. Another disadvantage is that software attacks, where data is
modified after being sensed, can be detected only when less than t+ 1 nodes have
been compromised.
An orthogonal approach, as opposed to those discussed above, and closer to
what is presented in this chapter, is for data portals to use systems like Pioneer or
SWATT (SoftWare-based ATTestation) to externally verify the code executing on
a remote data producer’s platform [113, 114]. With assurance in the producer’s
sensing platform, the portal will be inclined to trust data from it. Unlike our
trusted-hardware approach, both SWATT and Pioneer are software-based systems
that challenge the remote platform to compute a digest of its memory contents.
The digest is computed by traversing the memory in a pseudo-random fashion
as determined by the random challenge. The challenger is expected to know the
memory contents of the remote platform beforehand and can therefore compute
the correct digest independently for verification later in the protocol. A remote
platform could fool the challenger by separately storing the original contents of
the modified portions of memory, allowing it to still provide the correct digest.
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However, since the traversal is pseudo-random, the malicious platform cannot know
before hand the order in which the memory will be checked. As a result, the
attacker will have to check each memory access to see if the addresses matches one
of the modified ones. This extra check will cause the digest computation operation
to take longer than expected, causing the challenger to become suspicious. Notice
though, that both SWATT and Pioneer cannot prevent a Sybil attack from an
adversary that has abundant computational resources. The attacker could simulate
the remote platform on more powerful hardware while still meeting the expected
response time. Since the response time of the remote platform is an estimate
based on the hardware configuration and the expected communication latency,
SWATT and Pioneer only provide a probabilistic guarantee of the remote platform’s
integrity. Estimating response times may itself be a daunting task.
Our protocol is inspired by an approach in traditional sensing called Secure
Information Aggregation (SIA) [103]. However, unlike our approach, SIA assumes
that the sensors are trustworthy and does not provide an implementation of the
protocols. Our framework also makes it easy to incorporate other SIA algorithms
that are more suitable for the respective aggregation function.
3.10 DISCUSSION
We recognize the use of the TPM cannot protect against all failure modes. For
example, sensor measurements may be inherently corrupt, sensors maybe damaged,
or a sensor’s environment may be doctored. It is also likely that not every user
has a Trusted Sensing Peripheral. In this case, the crowd-sourced sensing system
could still collect data from untrusted sensing platforms, but then use the data
from trusted peripherals to calibrate or validate the untrusted data. We plan to
address a solution along these lines in future work.
The types of aggregation functions addressed in this chapter, work on discrete
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windows of data. Thus, calculating metrics like the median would require a differ-
ent aggregation protocol. Nonetheless, such a protocol could easily be integrated
within our current framework.
The TSP may duplicate some functionality of in-built smart phone sensors such
as audio and GPS, however, it also enables the addition of a wide range of new
sensors such as CO, CO2, humidity, temperature, seismic, and medical sensors.
For example, carbon monoxide studies in Ghana, Accra used an additional device
attached to the phone [97]. Furthermore, the TSP can be connected to a legacy
mobile device, as such it is possible to deploy a trustworthy crowd-sourced sensing
application without the cooperation of smart phone OEMs such as Apple or Nokia.
3.11 CONCLUSION
This chapter presented the design and implementation of a Trusted Sensing Pe-
ripheral (TSP) to provide data authenticity and integrity for crowd-sourced sensing
systems. The TSP has built-in sensors, and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
that helps it resist software and Sybil attacks to its platform. The TPM attests
to the integrity of published data at the source, and this attestation is verified at
a remote server. The TSP is energy-efficient, with a battery life of over 80 days
when collecting a temperature sample every 30 seconds.
Our secure data aggregation protocol STAP allows an untrusted intermediate
mobile proxy to aggregate the TSP’s raw signed sensor readings, while allowing
the data portal to detect a malicious proxy that fabricates those aggregates. The
portal can detect a lying proxy with very little overhead, and can do so within the
first six fabricated aggregates received.
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Chapter 4
HIGH-INTEGRITY PRIVACY-PRESERVING CROWD-SOURCED
SENSING
Integrity of the received data and the privacy of the data sources remain first
order concerns for crowd-sourced sensing systems. Unfortunately, people will be
reluctant to volunteer sensitive information (e.g. location, health statistics) if they
cannot trust the system to protect their privacy. Conversely, if the volunteered
information is first modified to protect privacy, then the system will be reluctant
to trust that modification without proof of its integrity.
Consequently, integrity and privacy compete with each other. If the collected
data has been previously transformed to preserve privacy (e.g. mixed, aggregated),
then a data consumer cannot determine the transformation’s integrity unless the
raw data used as input is presented as well. However, if the raw data is presented,
then the privacy of the data sources gets compromised. This chapter describes how
the trust-but-verify approach can be used to provide simultaneous data integrity
and privacy guarantees without significantly compromising either.
4.1 APPLYING THE TRUST-BUT-VERIFY APPROACH
In the previous chapter, we described a verification function that enabled crowd-
sourced sensing applications to determine the integrity of data received from in-
dividual sources. Recall however, that the information collected by the trusted
sensing peripheral was sent to the consumer as-is, implying that the data sources
had no privacy.
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In this chapter, we develop a verification function that in addition to guaran-
teeing data integrity preserves privacy as well. This is done by involving a trusted
intermediary that aggregates the data from multiple volunteers in a way that pre-
serves privacy. In this case, the generation function is the aggregation performed by
this intermediary and the data to verify is the output of this aggregation function.
The verification function, then, must allow the consumer to check the integrity
of this aggregate without needing the original data used to compute it. The key
idea is to use a homomorphic commitment scheme [98] that allows the consumer
to compute the same aggregation function over commitments to the original data.
The result is then checked against a commitment to the initially received aggre-
gate. A volunteer’s data remains private because the respective commitments do
not reveal any information about the data.
4.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
This chapter describes LocationProof, a protocol that enables a crowd-sourced sens-
ing application to establish the integrity of location-based data while preserving
the privacy of those who collected that data. The focus is mainly on location-based
information since location privacy has become a fundamental concern in crowd-
sourced sensing applications [43, 61, 49, 71]. It has been shown that anonymizing
an individual’s location traces are not enough to preserve privacy since they can
be used to infer where a person lives and works [73, 148, 70, 146]. Moreover, Mon-
tjoye et al. [32] showed that among half a million anonymized traces at cell-tower
granularity, just four spatio-temporal points were enough to uniquely identify the
traces of 95% of individuals.
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4.3 SYSTEM MODEL
The system model assumes a set of trusted data sources that collect and forward
sensory data to an aggregator, which aggregates the received data, and finally
forwards the result to a data consumer. The goal is to assure the data consumer
that the proxy indeed computed the expected aggregation function using data
from expected sources (integrity) without providing the consumer with that data
(privacy).
Much of the existing work on crowd-sourced sensing, with a focus on integrity
and privacy, adheres to this model. Examples include PoolView [49], which intro-
duces the personal privacy firewall to perturb a user’s raw data before publishing it
to an aggregation service; DietSense [106], which provides private storage to a user
where she can edit the images collected from her phone before sharing it further,
AnonySense [71], which uses a trusted server to mix data from at least k clients
to provide k-anonymity; and our earlier work on the design and implementation
of a Trusted Sensing Peripheral (TSP) that produces and publishes trustworthy
sensory information to a data portal via the user’s personal mobile device [38].
Figure 4.1 describes the system model more formally. The crowd-sourced sens-
ing system involves a set of sources S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} contributing data to an
aggregator A, which aggregates the received data and forwards it to a consumer
C. The data for a source i includes a tuple (xij, yij, dij) consisting of the source’s lo-
cation coordinate (x, y) and associated sensory data d (e.g. temperature) during in-
terval j. The aggregation function computed by A is the mean (x¯j, y¯j, d¯j) of respec-
tive tuple elements contributed by groups of at least k users in each interval j (note
that n ≥ k). The sources are assumed to be contributing data as part of a cam-
paign that defines the anonymity parameter k, the data collection intervals j, the
type of data d to collect, and a rectangular region R = [(xmin, ymin), (xmax, ymax)]
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to collect the data in. The goal is to enable C to validate the result of the ag-
gregation that A is performing, without learning the data that was aggregated.
s1
s2
s n
A C
(xj , yj , d j)(x2j , y2j , d 2j)
(x1j , y1j , d1j)
Figure 4.1: System model for privacy-preserving high-integrity crowd-sourced sens-
ing
4.4 BACKGROUND
The privacy LocationProof provides depends on several fundamental concepts: k-
anonymity, the Hilbert Cloak [52], the Pedersen homomorphic commitment scheme
[98], and the Trusted Sensing Peripheral (Chapter 3).
4.4.1 k-anonymity
k-anonymity is a concept first introduced by Samarati and Sweeny [111] to protect
the privacy of individuals when disclosing person-specific information (e.g. medical
data for research purposes). Such information is assumed to be released in the
form of a table where each row contains the data pertaining to one individual.
The basic idea is that any person’s record must be made indistinguishable from
the records of at least k − 1 others by suppressing or generalization the values
of individual fields in the released data set. Thus, given only the released data,
the probability that a given record belongs to a particular individual is at most
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1/k. Gruteser and Grunwald [57] applied this idea towards anonymous usage of
location-based services. The goal is to ensure that information requested for any
region contains at least k requestors. Such a region is called a location cloak and
it mitigates the severity of inference attacks : performing reverse-location lookups
on an individual’s location traces to re-identify them. Since k-anonymity ensures
that any trace contains at least k people, a reverse-lookup reveals information that
could correspond to any of the k individuals.
4.4.2 Hilbert Cloak: k-anonymous Location Cloaking
There are many strategies for computing a location cloak in a way that preserves
k-anonymity. Consider our system model, where data sources are periodically
collecting location-based information in a region R. In this scenario, we could
achieve k-anonymity by computing a cloak that includes all users in the region as
long as there are more than k of them. However, this only gives us one aggregated
data point per interval for the entire region R regardless of its size. For more fine-
grained data, it is desirable to create multiple location cloaks, each of which, are
large enough to preserve k-anonymity. Gkoulalas et al. [52] provide an exhaustive
analysis of the various strategies that can be used. One of the more efficient and
secure algorithms is the Hilbert Cloak by Kalnis et al. [70]. The Hilbert Cloak
translates a two-dimensional location coordinate into a one-dimensional distance
on the Hilbert space filling curve. It has been shown that points close-by in 2D
space are also close together on the Hilbert curve with high probability [88].
One can get an intuitive understanding of this result from Figure 4.2, which
shows how points on the Hilbert curve represent points in 2D-space. Once the
aggregator A has converted each location into a point on the Hilbert curve, it
can sort those points and group them sequentially into buckets containing at least
k sources each. Then, the region occupied by each group of k or more sources
represents the group’s location cloak.
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Figure 4.2: The Hilbert curve (left: 4× 4, right: 8× 8). Source: Kalnis et al. 2007
[70]
4.4.3 Homomorphic Commitment Scheme
As depicted by the system model in Section 4.3, the aggregator A computes the
mean location (representing the cloak) for each group of k data sources and sends
it to consumer C. C may then request A to prove that the mean was computed
correctly using only the locations from sources in S. This work describes a protocol
that allows A to do just that but without ever revealing the sensitive data source
locations that were used as input. The protocol employs Pedersen’s homomorphic
commitment scheme [98] as a fundamental building block.
A commitment is a function of a value that does not reveal anything about
that value. For example, E(v, l) is a commitment to the value v using key l. The
commitment can later be verified when the actual value v and key l are revealed.
Verification involves computing the commitment function over the revealed value
and comparing with the previously received commitment. Pedersen’s commitment
scheme has one other property: it is additively homomorphic, that is, it allows
computing over commitments to values v1 and v2 using an operation  such that
E(v1, l1) E(v2, l2) = E(v1 + v2, l1 + l2).
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In Pedersen’s scheme:
E(v, l) = gvhl
and operation  is multiplication. Here, g, h are publicly known elements of a
group Gq and v, l are elements of Zq = {0, 1, ..., q − 1}. Given two large primes p
and q where q divides p− 1, the group Gq is a subgroup of Zp such that
a ∈ Gq ⇐⇒ aq = 1 and a ∈ Zp
Notice that any element of Gq (except 1) generates the group and thus, for any
two elements a, b ∈ Gq the discrete logarithm logb(a) is defined. The assumption
is that given a, b ∈ Gq, finding logb(a) is computationally intractable.
4.4.4 Trusted Sensing Peripheral (TSP)
Pedersen’s additive homomorphic commitment scheme allows C to check if A is
correctly aggregating the data. However, this still does not address the problem
of how C can determine that the location-based information collected by the data
sources accurately reflects their environment. Malicious sources could easily fab-
ricate the location-based data without C knowing. In this work, we assume that
either the sources in S are implicitly trusted, or use TSPs to perform the sensing.
When TSPs are used, the sources could prove the integrity of the platform using
the simple method described in Section 4.6. This way C would know that the data
came from a trustworthy source, and along with A’s proof that it was processed
correctly. We will see in Section 4.5 that to preserve privacy a TSP must prove the
integrity of its platform while remaining anonymous. It can do so using an anony-
mous signature scheme called Direct Anonymous Attestation [22] supported by its
Trusted Platform Module [134] (the embedded secure co-processor that forms the
root-of-trust for the TSP).
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4.5 THREAT MODEL
Our protocol is designed to prevent a malicious C from compromising a source’s
location privacy, and prevent a malicious A from either injecting fabricated data
or computing an aggregation function other than the mean. Since data consumer
C has a vested interest in the integrity of the received information, it is assumed
to be an adversary of privacy, but not of integrity. Thus, given any locally avail-
able protocol state information and the aggregated data from A, we would like to
prevent C from recovering a source’s raw data, or hone in on its location. C may
narrow down a source’s location using side-channel information it may already
know about a particular source. Consider the intersection attack [70, 34] where
C knows that a particular source si participates in data collection and that si is
in some general area A at time t. Now, if at the same time, C discovers another
area A′ where si is, then the intersection of A and A′ reveals a smaller area con-
taining si. These attacks succeed even if areas A and A
′ preserve k-anonymity.
The root cause is a lack of strong initial anonymity: notice that the consumer C is
able to link two physical regions because they are associated with some identifying
information about source si first revealed by the application itself. Such identi-
fying information could include user IDs used during a registration phase, or IP
addresses that remain the same across multiple data submissions. Thus, keeping
a source anonymous during all steps of the LocationProof protocol is critical to
preserving data source privacy.
The privacy proxy A is considered to be an adversary of integrity, but not of
privacy. A is not considered an adversary of privacy because we assume that A is
either controlled by the sources [49] or is implicitly trusted by them to protect their
privacy [85, 71]. However, now, C would like to know that the data it is interested
in, is being processed correctly. Thus, from C’s perspective A is considered an
adversary of integrity. An implication of the above adversarial model is that A
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si
Existing estimate
for location of si
New estimate
Figure 4.3: The intersection attack: given some previous estimate of a source si’s
location and any new estimate, the intersection of the two reveals a finer estimate
of si’s location.
and C do not collude in any way.
We do not consider threats from eavesdropping adversaries since standard net-
work security protocols, like TLS, can easily be used to combat them. We also do
not consider situations in which A, C, and S do not interact sincerely, implying
that neither side suppresses a response expected by the other. Further, we assume
S is trusted; either implicitly or by the use of a Trusted Sensing Peripheral as de-
scribed in Chapter 3, and that its origin is anonymized when communicating with
C via a mix network like Tor [35]. Sources must also be capable of performing
anonymous signatures like those described in group signature schemes [28, 21] or
use Direct Anonymous Attestation [22] when TSPs are employed for data sensing.
4.6 THE PROTOCOL
As shown in Figure 4.1, C receives the means (x¯j, y¯j, d¯j) of data collected by sources
S, via A. In each interval j, C can choose to accept the aggregated data as-is, or
challenge A to prove its integrity.
This challenge message marks the beginning of the LocationProof protocol.
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LocationProof enables clients to send a response that allows C to determine if
the means were computed correctly, while not revealing anything about the in-
puts used to compute them. More specifically, each source si sends homomorphic
commitments to functions of its inputs. Then, C computes commitments to the
initially received means, and checks if they equal to the means computed using
commitments from the data sources. For simplicity, Section 4.6.2 first explains
the protocol using only k data sources, implying that data from all k sources is
aggregated in each interval. Later, in Section 4.6.3, we elaborate on how the pro-
tocol can be modified to provide integrity guarantees for data collected from n ≥ k
sources.
4.6.1 Requirements
The following is required from the LocationProof protocol:
1. The data consumer is never provided with the raw data (xij, yij, dij). This
is the basic privacy requirement.
2. The data consumer should not have any identifying information about the
data sources. Otherwise, the consumer could execute an intersection attack
to narrow down the location of a source.
3. The data consumer should be able to determine:
• that the inputs used to compute the means were provided by sources in
S
• that indeed the means as opposed to any other functions were computed
on those inputs.
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si A C
interval j:
sense xij
si → A: xij
b = xij xj =
∑
1≤i≤k xij
A→ C: xj
x¯j = xj/k
interval j + 1:
sense xi(j+1)
si → A: xi(j+1)
b = xi(j+1) xj+1 =
∑
1≤i≤k xi(j+1)
... ... ...
Table 4.1: Normal operation: sources in S collect data and send it to A. A
aggregates the data and forwards the result to C. Please note that protocol steps
below occur at a later time than those above. The notation e1 → e2 : m implies
that entity e1 sends message m to entity e2.
4.6.2 With k Data Sources
We assume in this section that the number of data sources n = k. This allows us
to defer the discussion of how n users are split up into groups of k for preserving
k-anonymity. Also, we focus on verifying the integrity of one element, say xij, from
the tuple of data collected by each source. The same verification process must be
repeated for each tuple element.
Table 4.1 describes the “normal operation” of a data source si, the privacy
proxy A, and data consumer C. Here, normal operation represents the activities
of all entities in intervals where C does not challenge A to prove the integrity of
the aggregated data. After collecting data, a source si buffers that data for one
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additional interval. As shown in Table 4.2, this is required because the sources
learn about C’s challenge for data sent in interval j during interval j + 1. Thus,
the sources must be prepared to prove the integrity of data they collected in the
last interval. On receiving each source’s data, A sums them all and sends the
total to C. C can then use the sum to compute the mean x¯j. The reason that A
sends the sum (an integer) rather than the mean (possibly non-integer) is to avoid
passing around fractional numbers: numbers that cannot be committed to under
the Pedersen scheme [98] used in our integrity verification algorithm.
We now discuss the privacy-preserving data verification function at the heart
of LocationProof. Let’s say data consumer C challenges A during some interval
j. In turn, A informs all the sources to prepare a response for data collected in
interval j after it receives their data for interval j+ 1. As shown in Table 4.2, each
source responds to A with a random number lij, a commitment E(xij, lij), and an
anonymous signature σij over the commitment E(xij, lij) to xij.
The random number lij serves as a key to the commitment scheme for source
si during interval j. Also, the anonymous signature σij is obtained by comput-
ing Sign(gpk, gsk[i], E(xij, lij)). Here, Sign represents the signature computation
function of a group signature scheme [21, 22], gpk the group’s public key, and gsk[i]
the corresponding secret key for source i. A group signature scheme preserves the
anonymity of signer by not revealing the specific group member that created the
signature. A signature can be verified using Verify(gpk, E(xij, lij), σij). If veri-
fication succeeds, then the verifier learns that someone in the group created the
signature, but not who in particular.
A then sums up the keys and sends the result lj along with all the commitments
and signatures to C. Here, lj represents C’s key to the commitment scheme. C
then verifies all the signatures, computes a commitment a1 = E(xj, lj) to the sum
xj, a commitment a2 = E(x1j, l1j) . . .E(xkj, lkj) using the commitments from
each source, and checks if a1
?
= a2. If this check fails or any of the signatures can’t
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be validated, then the consumer rejects the data xj.
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4.6.3 With n ≥ k Sources
When the number of data sources n ≥ k, the privacy proxy A needs to determine
which users to group together. Once the sources have been grouped, the Location-
Proof protocol described in Section 4.6.2 must be repeated for each group. A could
always group all sources together, but then, there would only be one data point
(x¯j, y¯j, d¯j) during each interval j for the data collection region R regardless of how
large it was. For more fine-grained location-based information, A needs to cluster
as few close-by users as possible. More specifically, to preserve k-anonymity, A
must place at least k users in each group. Gkoulalas et al. [52] provide an exhaus-
tive overview of algorithms that cluster close-by data sources into groups of k or
more. The clustering protocol assumed by LocationProof is HilbertCloak [52], and
we have described it in Section 4.4. Eventually, when C challenges the integrity of
data received in some interval j for a given k-group, the LocationProof protocol
for that group continues as described in Section 4.6.2.
4.7 IMPLEMENTATION
We have simulated each of the components of LocationProof in Java. Data sources
are assumed to be participating in a data collection campaign to gather tempera-
ture data in an area around downtown Portland, OR. The region R where sources
simulate data collection is shown in Figure 4.4. In each interval, sources pick a ran-
dom temperature at a random location in region R and send it to the aggregator.
When C challenges the integrity of an aggregate, sources send the homomorphic
commitments to the data they collected in the corresponding interval.
The Pedersen homomorphic commitment scheme [98] was implemented using
the Java Qilin library [89]. Since the commitment scheme only works with integers,
a latitude x in region R was converted to an integer offset from the base using the
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Figure 4.4: Data collection campaign simulated for a region around downtown
Portland, OR. R = [(−122.752◦, 45.455◦), (−122.556◦, 45.560◦)]
following formula:
(x− xmin)× 106
A longitude in the region R was converted similarly. Both latitudes and longitudes
were represented using 6 digits of precision in our implementation.
4.8 SECURITY ANALYSIS
As discussed in Section 4.5, LocationProof must be capable of preventing a mali-
cious C from compromising the privacy of data sources using the intersection or
inference attacks. LocationProof prevents these attacks by ensuring that sources
remain anonymous from C’s perspective at all times. There is no registration phase
and all data submissions happen via aggregator A. Furthermore, when sending the
response to C’s challenge, each source only sends commitments to their locations
rather than the locations themselves. The signatures on the responses are also
anonymous. Thus, C never obtains any linkable identifying information from the
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application about sources across submissions.
Another threat LocationProof considers is the one to data integrity from ag-
gregator A. LocationProof prevents A from injecting inputs to the aggregation
function, or computing a different aggregation function altogether. This is done
by enabling C, the party most interested in the integrity of the aggregate, to chal-
lenge the result of the aggregation function. Using the homomorphic commitment
scheme, the data sources help C ensure that A is computing the right function us-
ing the right inputs. C has the choice of checking every aggregate for correctness
or some fraction of them. However, when checking only a fraction, C may miss
some fabricated aggregates before eventually detecting a malicious aggregator. We
analyze how long this might take in Section 4.9.
4.9 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate LocationProof to determine, (i) detection time: how
long it takes a consumer C to detect a malicious A, and (ii) source overhead : the
computational burden LocationProof places on a source.
4.9.1 Detection Time
If C challenges the integrity of aggregate xt received in each interval t, then it can
detect a malicious A the first time it lies, i.e. injects fabricated data or computes
an aggregation function other than the sum. However, in the interest of efficiency
C could choose to randomly challenge A with a probability p during any given
interval t. The random challenge forces the aggregator to guess when it is safe to
fabricate xt. Eventually, a lying aggregator will guess wrong and get caught. Lying
more only causes the aggregator to be detected faster, and lying less only delays
that outcome. The number of intervals before an aggregator lying with probability
q is detected can be modeled using the negative binomial distribution.
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Figure 4.5: Expected number of intervals before aggregator A lying with probabil-
ity q is detected by consumer C challenging with probability p.
The discrete negative binomial distribution NB(r, p) describes the probability
of the number of “successes” in a sequence of binomial trials before r “failures”
occur. The success and failure probabilities are p and 1 − p respectively. In the
LocationProof protocol, “success” is represented by the event, “not detecting a
lying proxy”, and “failure” is represented by the event, “detecting the lying proxy”.
Thus, the success and failure probabilities in any given interval are 1− pq and pq
respectively. Also, since we are interested in the number of intervals before a lying
aggregator is caught for the first time, the parameter r = 1.
Now, the expected number of successes for a negative binomial distribution
with the above parameters represents the expected number of intervals before a
lying aggregator is caught for the first time, and this can be written as
1− pq
pq
Figure 4.5 shows the expected number of intervals before aggregator A lying
with probabilities q = {0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7} is detected by consumer C challenging
with probabilities .01 ≤ p ≤ .99. We can see that while challenging 20% of
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the time, the consumer is expected to detect a lying aggregator within 7 to 24
intervals for the aforementioned set of lying probabilities q. However, challenging
only a fraction of intervals also implies that the application must be resilient to
some amount of fabricated data. A consumer C can thus choose its challenge
probability p depending on how mission critical the application is.
4.9.2 Source Overhead
In this section, we measure the time and energy required by the sources to compute
commitments. These measurements reflect the computational overhead Location-
Proof places on data sources. Recall that LocationProof requires sources to create
commitments of their location coordinates and corresponding data in response to
C’s challenge. Table 4.3 shows the overhead experienced by an Android Nexus 4
platform (Version 4.3; quad-core 1.5 GHz processor; 2 GB RAM) and the Trusted
Sensing Peripheral (Chapter 3).
Android TSP
Current 144 mA 55 mA
Time 2.325 msec (±1.26) 3.44 sec (±0.03)
Energy Consumption 1.2 mJ 5 Joules
Table 4.3: Computational cost of computing commitments for a tuple of data
(xij, yij, dij) on a standard Android smart-phone and the Trusted Sensing Periph-
eral (TSP). Note the 95% confidence intervals indicated next to timing measure-
ments.
In the case of Trusted Sensing Peripherals (TSP), the time and energy mea-
surements have been extrapolated from those of software RSA encryption on the
TSP (Figure 3.5(b)). An RSA encryption requires one modular exponentiation as
opposed to the two required to create a commitment. Thus, computing a com-
mitment will require approximately twice as much energy as an RSA encryption
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assuming the cost of the product operation is relatively insignificant1. Thus, the
energy consumed will be around 2 × 0.25 = 5 Joules per commitment and since
three commitments are computed per challenge, the energy consumption will be 6
times more than software RSA. Consequently, the battery life will be 1/6th of the
lifetime achieved with software RSA. Figure 3.5(a) depicts the battery life of the
TSP when performing RSA encryptions in software. Performing one encryption
every 30 seconds, the TSP achieves a battery life of ≈ 80 days. If C were to chal-
lenge the data in each such interval, implying p = 1, the battery life of the TSP
would reduce to approximately 1/6× 80 = 13.33 days. However, with a challenge
probability p = 0.2, the sources would have to compute commitments only 1/5th
of the time, improving the battery life to ≈ 66 days.
4.10 RELATED WORK
Much of the previous security oriented work in crowd-sourced sensing has focused
either on data integrity, or privacy, but not both. PoolView [49] enables commu-
nity statistics to be computed using perturbed private data, but trusts its users
to honestly perturb that data. PriSense [116] employs data slicing and mixing
to provide privacy while still supporting a wide variety of aggregation functions.
However, it is assumed the functions themselves are honestly computed. Our work
on Trusted Sensing Peripherals [38] supports high-integrity aggregation, but does
not provide privacy guarantees.
VPriv [100] seeks to offer integrity and privacy for computing functions (e.g.
total toll) over paths driven by individual vehicles. However, VPriv offers location
privacy by keeping the uploaded location tuples anonymous. Anonymity, in turn,
is provided using pseudonyms. Unfortunately, it has been shown that pseudonyms
don’t protect against inference attacks [73] since the uploaded tuples contain the
1The current draw remains the same during modular exponentiations, but since there are two
per commitment, the entire computation takes twice as long
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raw locations. Additionally, VPriv does not support aggregating data from multi-
ple sources.
PrivStats [101] uses a combination of homomorphic encryption [94] and trusted
intermediaries to provide integrity guarantees to the data consumer while protect-
ing the privacy of data sources. The sources upload location-based information
that they encrypt using additive homomorphic encryption. The consumer then
computes over these encrypted tuples and sends the result back to a trusted
intermediary (can be one of the data sources). The trusted intermediary then
decrypts and returns the final result. Although, the PrivStats data publication
model is similar to LocationProof, it does not support collecting actual locations,
just location-based information (e.g. vehicle speed) from pre-determined locations.
Additionally, PrivStats relies on the separation of duties to preserve privacy. More
specifically, malicious clients colluding with the consumer can compromise the pri-
vacy of other users. This is because the consumer gets encrypted samples of data,
the decryption keys for which, belong to the users.
Unlike PrivStats [101], Rastogi et al. [105] and Shi et al. [115] protect a data
source’s location privacy while actually collecting locations as part of the data.
The fundamental tools are still homomorphic encryption [94] and a scheme similar
to the Pedersen commitment scheme [98] used in LocationProof respectively. How-
ever, they are query-based data collection systems, implying that the application
must first know the identities of the users it needs data from. Since sources are
not anonymous to the system, their locations are vulnerable to intersection attacks
(see Section 4.10). Another important issue is that there is no way to know which
general area the location-based information will come from: again, since these sys-
tems are query-based and the data source locations are private, the only solution
is to randomly query subsets of users and only then can the consumer learn the
region where data was collected from. Thus, unlike LocationProof, these systems
provide no control over the granularity of the collected location-based information.
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4.11 LIMITATIONS
Currently, LocationProof can only be used to verify a location cloak represented
by the mean of locations it contains. A more useful cloak should depict the extent
of the cloaked region as well. For example, in addition to the mean, aggregator
A could also compute and send the standard deviation to C. Since the standard
deviation is also a mean (of distances from the mean), LocationProof can be used to
prove its integrity [25]. However, it is yet to be determined if giving the consumer C
both the standard deviation and the mean compromises a source’s location privacy.
Consider, for example, a brute-force attack where C tries all possible combinations
of k locations in R that satisfy both the mean and the standard deviation. If the
set of location combinations is small, then C may be able to learn the precise
locations of the k sources in the cloak. We hope to explore this attack further in
future work.
4.12 CONCLUSION
Crowd-sourced sensing has a bright future, but both the integrity of the collected
data and the privacy of data sources are always at risk. Without integrity assur-
ances, data consumers like the government or researchers will be reluctant to use
the data, and without privacy assurances, people will be reluctant to contribute
the data.
We have proposed a solution based on Pedersen’s homomorphic-commitment
scheme that simultaneously addresses the conflicting problems of integrity and
privacy. This solution allows an intermediary to convince a data consumer that
it is accurately performing a privacy-preserving transformation with inputs from
trusted sources, without providing those inputs to the consumer. Sources can be
trusted when, for example, they provide verifiable attestations to the integrity of
sensed data with the aid of integrated trusted platform modules [38].
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Chapter 5
NON-INTRUSIVE CHEAT DETECTION IN ONLINE GAMES
A lot of hidden information is present in client programs of most existing online
multi-player games (e.g. unexplored map regions, opponent resource information).
This hidden information is necessary to locally render a player’s view of the game,
thus, avoiding the overhead of retrieving it from the server before each move. How-
ever, the same hidden information can be exploited by cheaters to gain an unfair
advantage over other players. Cheating has been shown to degrade the playing
experience for honest players and eventually cause loss of revenue for game devel-
opers [144]. For example, in the real-time strategy game Age of Empires, a “map
hack” allows the cheater to uncover map areas by modifying game client memory
rather than actually exploring them. Similarly, inspecting game client memory
can also reveal an opponent’s secret resources or activities normally hidden from
the player. In the words of Matthew Pritchard [102], “this cheating method was
the next best thing to looking over the shoulders of his [the cheater’s] opponents.”
Such cheats have been classified under the term information exposure [145, 102]
and have traditionally been identified using stealth memory and process scanning
programs deployed on a client’s gaming device. Warden [112, 84] is one such
scanning software used by the popular game World of Warcraft [19]. Warden has
suffered from false positives, performance issues, and has been labeled “spyware”
by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
A less invasive method for preventing information exposure cheats involves
minimizing the hidden state information in the game client. This is done by having
the server load a client’s game state information on-demand [75]. For example, the
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server could gradually expose only those portions of the game map a player can
’see’. Unfortunately, this method introduces game rendering delays because clients
now need to retrieve state information from the server after each move. Further, the
computational overhead of managing, disseminating, and maintaining consistency
across views hinders server scalability [137, 83, 75]. As a result, servers opt for
the simpler eager loading mechanism, in which, move updates from one player
are sent to every other player as they happen. This way, clients always have
the game rendering information available locally and the server does not have to
manage each player’s game state as in on-demand loading. The drawback is that
game clients are forced to secretly store sensitive game-state information belonging
to other players — regardless of whether its needed to render the current game
view. Thus, methods like eager-loading, although efficient, create the threat of
information exposure cheats. What is needed, is a more efficient method to detect
or prevent information exposure cheats.
5.1 APPLYING THE TRUST-BUT-VERIFY APPROACH
As discussed above, on-demand loading involves game servers accepting a player’s
move, computing a game view based on the new move, and returning the view so
that it can be rendered by the game client. It has been shown that computing this
view remotely results in significant game rendering delays. In this chapter, we use
the trust-but-verify approach to oﬄoad some of that computation to the client.
More specifically, after each move, a client computes and submits a view descriptor
which also represents the data to verify. The computation of this view descriptor
represents the generation function. The server then validates the descriptor and
returns a response containing the contents of the view (e.g. other players, moving
obstructions). Validation involves checking if the descriptor is consistent with the
player’s last move and the current global game state. This validation represents
the verification function in the trust-but-verify model.
67
5.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
This chapter presents a system called SpotCheck that provides a more balanced
defense against information exposure cheats in client–server online games. Like
on-demand loading, SpotCheck eliminates the need for hidden information in the
game client; and like eager loading it doesn’t require the server to track a client’s
view. The lack of hidden information obviates the need for invasive cheat detection
software like Warden [112]. However, information exposure cheats can still occur
by sending illegal view descriptors to the server. The advantage with SpotCheck is
that the overhead of checking the view descriptor can be traded for improved game
performance. For example, instead of checking every view descriptor, the server can
randomly check only a fraction of them. Although this introduces opportunities
for cheating, repeat offenders will eventually be identified. The general system
model in which SpotCheck is applicable is discussed in Section 5.3. SpotCheck’s
design is presented in Sections 5.4 – 5.8 and an evaluation of its efficiency and
effectiveness in the context of a simple real-time strategy game called Explorer is
described in Section 5.9.
5.3 SYSTEM MODEL
SpotCheck is applicable in online map-based games with a client–server architec-
ture. More specifically, as Figure 5.1 depicts, SpotCheck enables the game client
to compute a view for a player’s character (in the game) based on the player’s
input move. The idea is that as long as the view contains only those portions of
the map the player’s character is “supposed” to see in that stage of the game, then
the player could not be cheating. For example, if a character’s view is obstructed
by a hill, but the view sent to the server includes portions of the map behind the
hill, then the player must be cheating. The server can check for such fabricated
views to detect malicious players.
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Figure 5.1: After the user enters her move, the game client computes a description
of the view (e.g. newly visible map regions). The server trusts the client to compute
this view, but occasionally checks if the view descriptor was computed correctly.
In the trust-but-verify context (see Figure 2.1), the game client is the data
source, the server is the data consumer, and the generation function is the one
that computes the view descriptor. Note that since a user’s every move is sent
from the game client to the server, no intermediate aggregators are necessary.
5.4 MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORK
Our goal is to develop an effective and scalable solution for detecting information
exposure cheats in client–server online games. Existing solutions are either effective
and not scalable, or vice versa. Popular games like World of WarCraft [19] and
StarCraft [18] use an anti-cheating software called Warden [112], which runs on
the client, scanning periodically for signatures of common cheats [125]. Tools
like Warden are not always effective for two reasons. First, they cannot detect
new information exposure cheats. For example, earlier map hacks were easy to
detect because they were implemented by patching the game client, but new map
hacks are harder to detect because they are external to the game and work by
reading game memory and exposing the map areas via overlays [12]. Second,
the scanning performed by such tools is widely considered to be a risk to personal
privacy. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has even labeled Warden as “spyware”
[81]. Another solution, called on-demand loading [75], proposes a change to the
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server’s game state dissemination strategy that consequently prevents all forms
of information exposure cheats. In this method, the server disseminates state
information required to render the game only when clients need it. Thus, on-
demand loading eliminates any hidden information in the game client, leaving no
useful information to expose. Webb et al. [144] have called it the “most effective
solution” against this form of cheating. Unfortunately, the price of on-demand
loading is excessive server CPU overhead because the server must now track each
client’s view of the game. To avoid precisely this overhead, existing games like
World of Warcraft prefer eager-loading [75]. Eager-loading involves sending state
updates of one player to every other player. This eliminates the burden of tracking
every player’s view on the server and allows any client to independently render
the game. However, now, each player has state information belonging to all other
players whether or not it is needed to render their current view of the game. As a
result, the extraneous information is kept hidden in the game client waiting to be
exploited by those who know how to bypass cheat detection tools like Warden.
SpotCheck proposes a middle ground: trust the client to compute a description
of its own view, but enable the server to verify the description’s integrity. This
approach does not require the server to track client views, instead it only requires
the server to maintain global game state consistency and verify view descriptors.
As long as the verification process is cheaper than tracking a client’s view, our
approach will be more scalable than on-demand loading. Additionally, like on-
demand loading, game state information is disseminated to clients only as needed.
Thus, there is no hidden information in the game client that cheaters can exploit.
There is, however, another approach that could be used to prevent information
exposure cheats. Monch et al. [87] propose a technique that perpetually obfus-
cates all game state information stored in the client. The solution involves using
decoding and encoding functions before accessing or writing any game state infor-
mation. Also, since obfuscation does not provide cryptographic secrecy, the hiding
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functions are changed periodically via a secret channel. Thus, forcing an adversary
to constantly reverse engineer the hiding functions.
If hiding functions are efficient and can indeed be surreptitiously changed faster
than the time required to reverse engineer them, then the above solution may be
effective. Unfortunately, the efficiency of the solution, the feasibility of constantly
generating and secretly transmitting strong hiding functions, and in general the
feasibility of developing tamper-proof software is still unclear [144].
5.5 EXPLORER
We analyze SpotCheck in the context of a simple real-time strategy game we call
Explorer. The game consists of players exploring a 2D terrain consisting of walls
and other obstructions (Figure 5.2(a)). Multiple players can play the game and
each player can have multiple units exploring the terrain. The map of the terrain
is composed of grids and each grid can contain either the terrain itself, part of a
wall, a player’s unit, or an obstruction. Additionally, unexplored regions of the
terrain and those that are outside a unit’s vision are kept hidden from the player
(Figure 5.2(b)). At any given time, a unit’s vision consists of the contents of a
5 × 5 grid around its current position. The only exception is that units cannot
see through walls, thus, parts of the terrain that belong inside the vision but are
blocked by walls will still be hidden. Player units can move one grid at a time in
vertical or horizontal directions uncovering contents of unexplored regions of the
terrain. In its current state, the game defines no objectives, player unit resources,
or conditions for victory.
Formally though, SpotCheck is applicable to games consisting of the following
high-level components:
• 1 to n players
• 1 to m units per player
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Figure 5.2: Explorer overview
• Global game state St: the state of the game on the server after move t,
where t is a global move counter across all players. The global game state for
Explorer includes location and type information about terrain, obstructions,
and player units.
• Game map M : a set of e × e square-shaped cell locations. We assume a
square-shaped map and cell for simplicity, but SpotCheck need not be limited
by the shape of the map or the cell.
• View descriptor vit: the set of cell locations visible to all units of player i
after move t.
• View V it : view descriptor vit along with game state information associated
with cells in the descriptor.
• Explored Region Eit : game state information pertaining to the region of the
map explored by all the units of player i after move t.
• State request U it : sent to the server by player i after move t. The state request
consists of the view descriptor vit ,unit identifier and the new location of the
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player’s unit.
• State update Dit: sent from the server to the client after move t. The state
update may contain a player’s current view if generated in response to a state
request, or it may contain changes to the player’s current view as a result of
moves by other players.
The game progresses as players make their moves and send corresponding state
requests to the server. On receipt, the server verifies the integrity of the state
request by randomly performing either a heuristic-based check, or a more expen-
sive full check. State requests for illegal cell locations could escape detection by
heuristic-based checks but will eventually be detected by the full check. We eval-
uate this further in Section 5.9. Once verification succeeds, the server sends back
a state update. The game client then uses this state update to render a player’s
current view of the game. Intermittently, move updates from other players cause
state updates to be sent to affected players. However, these updates only include
changes to a player’s current view.
Our game, Explorer, can be configured to disseminate state information using
the three different strategies discussed earlier: on-demand loading, eager loading,
and SpotCheck’s strategy. The state request in on-demand and eager loading
consists only of the player’s new unit location, where as for SpotCheck, the state
request contains the view descriptor as well. The state update in on-demand
loading and SpotCheck consists of the player’s view, where as in eager loading, it
consists of information in a state request from any of the n players.
5.6 CHEAT MODEL
SpotCheck addresses application-level information exposure cheats [144], but un-
like eager loading where these cheats are executed by accessing game client memory,
SpotCheck forces cheaters to send malformed state requests to the server. Recall
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that players progress in the game by sending and receiving responses to state re-
quests. These state requests contain the description of a player’s view, which is
verified by the server upon receipt. A cheater could conceivably construct a state
request with an illegal view descriptor vit
′
that includes locations out of its actual
view vit. For example, by requesting state information for a cell across a wall,
which by design blocks a unit’s line of sight. If the server is unable to detect such
malformed requests, then cheaters could potentially learn information about other
players in any portion of the map.
In the context of SpotCheck, accessing game client memory is not considered
an information exposure cheat. Mainly because SpotCheck eliminates the need for
any hidden information in the game client. Note that hidden information is defined
as any state information associated with map cells outside the explored region Eit .
In the case where the player’s view V it is a proper subset of the explored region
Eit , this definition does allow game state information E
i
t − V it in the client that is
not displayed to the player. However, this information is not considered hidden
because it was first displayed when the player last visited those cells and has not
been updated since.
Like on-demand loading, SpotCheck prevents infrastructure-level information
exposure cheats by design. These type of cheats involve using a network hub and
another host to sniff one’s own game traffic and change the way it is rendered on
screen. For example, modifying the display driver on the consorting host to render
the game world with transparent walls. In SpotCheck, since information about
cells outside a player’s view (e.g. behind walls) is never included in state updates,
it becomes futile to mount this type of cheat.
There are other ways of accessing hidden information that are outside SpotCheck’s
scope: a cheater might spoof a state request pretending to be another player. This
type of cheat would need to be addressed by introducing appropriate authentication
mechanisms [144]; a cheater might snoop another player’s communication channel
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with the server. This type of cheat would need to be addressed by encrypting com-
munications between the client and the server; a cheater might collude with other
players to gain collective information; and lastly, a cheater might compromise the
server to learn about global game state, which is normally not exposed to clients.
5.7 CHEAT DETECTION
The game server detects a cheat when it can’t verify the integrity of a client’s
state request. State requests are sent to the server each time a client moves one
of its units to a new location. The server then chooses to verify the state request
with a probability p. The randomness ensures that a cheater does not know before
hand if her state request is going to be checked or not. Without that knowledge,
a cheater risks being detected and subsequently banned from the game. Since
cheaters cannot progress in the game without sending state requests, they are
forced to take their chances.
Notice that when p = 1, every state request is checked. The parameter p
essentially enables SpotCheck to provide game servers the flexibility of balancing
resources used for game state management against those used for cheat detection.
This is unlike on-demand loading, where the server is forced to track every client’s
view. The trade off with SpotCheck is that a cheater may initially get away, but
with more cheat attempts a malicious player will eventually be identified. Thus,
assuming that a player cheats during a move with probability q, the expected
number of moves in which the cheater will be detected is:
E(T ) =
∞∑
t=1
t× (1− pq)t−1 × pq = 1− pq
pq
(5.1)
Where T is a discrete random variable representing the number of moves a
cheater can make before getting caught. We compare the expected outcome with
the experimental result in Section 5.9.
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The server validates a state request by performing a full check of its contents.
A state request contains the player unit’s new location (move), unit identity, and
a view descriptor. A move is considered valid if the unit advances to an empty
and allowed map cell (currently, our game does not support multiple units in the
same cell). A valid move results in an update to the global game state. Then, the
updated game state information is used to construct the expected view descriptor
for the player and compared to the one that was included in the request. Any
discrepancies between the two is considered a cheat attempt. A state request that
passes the full check is considered valid.
One disadvantage of probabilistically validating state requests is that easily pre-
ventable cheat attempts can occasionally escape detection. For example, a cheater
may retrieve a snapshot of the global game state by constructing a view descriptor
that includes all cell locations on the game map. This cheat can easily be prevented
by validating the size of the view descriptor. To prevent such cheats, SpotCheck
allows game servers to perform heuristic-based checks of the state request during
those moves when the complete check described above is not performed.
We have currently implemented two heuristic-based checks of the state request.
Each of these checks validate the range of legal values for individual components of
the state request. The first heuristic, called distance bound, checks if the player’s
move is legal. So for example, in Explorer, units are not allowed to move more than
one cell at a time. The second heuristic, called vision size bound, checks that the
size of the view descriptor does not exceed the possible maximum for the player.
5.8 ARCHITECTURE
The components of our game are split across the client and server. At a high level,
the game client accepts key stroke input and renders the game, whereas the server
validates the inputs and sends back the information necessary to render the game.
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5.8.1 Client Components
Game map. Stores the 2D game map. The map is composed of cells each of
which contain a wall, a player unit, an obstruction, or the terrain itself. Information
about the contents of the map is stored in the local game state.
Game state manager. All the information about a player’s explored region
is stored in the local game state. The state manager runs every time a move is
generated and sends the move along with the current view descriptor in a state
request to the server. The server validates the state request and sends back a state
update containing information required to render the player’s view.
Rendering engine. Renders units, obstructions, walls, and terrain on visible
portions of the map while blacking out the rest of the cells. After the state manager
has received the necessary information required to render the player’s view, it is
passed on to the rendering engine, which then draws the view on the screen.
Input mechanism. Interprets key strokes as moves and forwards them to the
game state manager.
5.8.2 Server Components
Request validator. As shown in Figure 5.8.2, the validator receives a state
request from the client and chooses to either validate it with a probability p or
check it using simple heuristics (see Section 5.7). A state request that passes the
checks is then forwarded to the state update generator.
State update generator. Uses information in the state request to update global
game state. Then, information pertaining to the player’s view is retrieved from
the global game state and sent as a state update.
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Figure 5.3: SpotCheck server-side architecture
It is worth mentioning that the state request validator need not run as part
of the request processing pipeline (Figure 5.8.2). The heuristic checks could still
be done serially while the full check would happen in the background. Any game
state corruption discovered during the full check may need to be reconciled. Al-
though we have not explicitly evaluated this alternative, we believe that having
the validator run in parallel can reduce state update response time and lead to an
improved gaming experience with minimal impact on cheat detection integrity or
performance.
Although SpotCheck is designed to detect information exposure cheats, it does
not preclude including methods that detect other classes of cheats. For example, in
the future, we plan to augment SpotCheck with code injection and entanglement
algorithms [87] that prevent bots/reflex enhancer cheats.
5.9 RESULTS
We will now evaluate SpotCheck against on-demand and eager loading while two
players play a game of Explorer. The performance of eager loading forms our base-
line since it provides no intrinsic protection against information exposure cheats
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Figure 5.4: Alternative architecture: request validation in parallel
and is currently the most prevalent method for disseminating game state informa-
tion. On-demand loading is very effective against protecting information exposure
cheats, but is expensive for game servers to implement.
Our goal is to significantly reduce the overhead on the game server when com-
pared to on-demand loading while providing similar levels of protection against
information exposure cheats. Specifically, we will compare server CPU overhead,
message sizes, and client game rendering latency of our approach with on-demand
and eager loading. We will also evaluate the time it takes for SpotCheck to detect
information exposure cheats.
5.9.1 Experimental Setup
The test system used to gather performance data is a Dell Latitude E6510 config-
ured with an Intel Core i5-M580 CPU running at 2.67 GHz with 4 GB of main
memory. Intel TurboBoost and SpeedStep were disabled through the system BIOS.
The operating system is a 32-bit Ubuntu 11.04 with Linux kernel version 2.6.38.9-
generic. All experiments were performed with the game client and server on the
same machine.
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5.9.2 Evaluation
Figure 5.5 plots server CPU overhead of the three schemes against units per player.
Additionally, SpotCheck is plotted for the scenarios where 100% (p = 1), 25%, and
5% of the state requests are checked. The CPU overhead is measured as the total
CPU time required by the server to process, check, and respond to a state request.
Here, map size is held constant at 100 × 100 cells and the error lines indicate a
95% confidence interval over 200 runs per data point. Unless mentioned, the stated
constants remain the same for all future plots.
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Figure 5.5: Server CPU overhead
The CPU overhead of SpotCheck and on-demand grows because more units
increase the size of a player’s view, which consequently, requires more process-
ing on the server. In eager loading, the game client deals with views, thus the
server’s overhead remains nearly constant and less than on-demand or SpotCheck.
SpotCheck 100% incurs more overhead than on-demand loading because checking
every state request is more expensive than tracking a player’s view. This is not
surprising because view tracking updates a stored view descriptor on the server
with every state request, where as validation involves the more expensive oper-
ation of computing a new one from scratch each time (see Section 5.7). Notice
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though that spot checking 5% of the requests requires nearly half the overhead of
on-demand, where as checking 25% requires slightly more.
Figure 5.6 plots expected (Equation 5.1) and observed number of moves SpotCheck
requires to detect an information exposure cheat versus various values of checking
(p) and cheating (q) frequencies. A move where no cheating takes place is referred
to as an “honest move”, while the opposite is referred to as a “cheat move”. For
this experiment, we perform an information exposure cheat by issuing an illegal
state request, where the view descriptor contains a location not in the player’s
current view. We also ensure that the information exposure cheat can bypass all
heuristic checks. Thus, the cheat can only be detected by a full check. We can see
that even when spot checking only 5% of the state requests, players cheating 50%
of the time are detected before their 25th cheat attempt. If players cheat less (5%)
and SpotCheck checks less (5%) then the number of moves required to detect a
cheater increase significantly, but the number cheat moves remain small (≈ 15).
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Figure 5.6: Expected (Ex) and Observed (Ob) number of moves before a cheat
attempt is discovered. Number of cheats that escaped detection are also shown as
a portion of total moves.
Figure 5.7 (top) plots the size of a state update against the percentage of
occupied locations visible to a player on the map. The size of the state update
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will significantly impact the server’s outbound bandwidth requirements as players
increase. Here, we focus on the request and update sizes for only one player
with five units in the game. Additionally, 120 randomly chosen map locations
are occupied by obstructions. In Explorer, the state update contains five bytes of
information per location. We can see that under SpotCheck and on-demand, the
size of the state update depends on the occupied locations visible to the player.
Under eager loading, the server is oblivious to a player’s view, thus it must send
information about all the locations in question, forcing the update size to be larger
than (or equal to) that of SpotCheck and on-demand.
Figure 5.7: State update and request message sizes
Figure 5.7 (bottom) plots the size of the state request against the percentage
of locations visible to a player on the map. Since the state request in eager and
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on-demand loading does not contain a view descriptor, its size remains smaller
than (or equal to) that of SpotCheck. Note, however, that Explorer uses the most
naive method of encoding view descriptors: four bytes per visible location. Using
better encoding schemes should result in much smaller request sizes.
Figure 5.8 plots client game rendering latency for SpotCheck (p = 0.05), on-
demand, and eager loading. Rendering latency is measured as total CPU time
between sending a state request and rendering the contents of the corresponding
state update on screen. Keep in mind that the client and server are on the same
machine hence the round-trip-time is fairly small. We can see that rendering
latency increases with units per player. This is mainly because more resources are
required to render the larger view of all units. SpotCheck and on-demand induce
more latency than eager loading because of the additional time the server spends
verifying the state request and tracking views respectively. Notice, however, that
the latency incurred by SpotCheck is consistently less than on-demand even though
SpotCheck requires more game processing on the client. This is because the server
is more efficient under SpotCheck than under on-demand when responding to state
requests.
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5.10 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented SpotCheck, an efficient defense against information exposure cheats.
SpotCheck strives to be the middle ground between on-demand loading, which
prevents this class of cheats entirely, but is expensive for the game server to imple-
ment; and eager loading, which provides no protection from cheats, but is preva-
lent in online games today due to its performance benefits. The key idea behind
SpotCheck is to allow the clients to track and request contents of their game view,
but randomly sample and validate their requests. SpotCheck allows game servers
to change the sampling frequency, thus trading off CPU overhead for increased
cheat protection or vice versa. We have shown that SpotCheck can reduce the
server CPU overhead by as much as half when compared to on-demand loading,
while still being an effective defense against information exposure cheats. In the
future, we plan to incorporate SpotCheck into a real-world game and evaluate its
performs with a much larger number of players.
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Chapter 6
EFFECTIVE SPAM PREVENTION IN ONLINE MESSAGING
APPLICATIONS
Internet spammers are relentless. Although, email spam is reducing (≈ 70.5% in
Jan 2012 from 92.2% in Aug 2010), the spam on social network sites is edging up
[51]. Approximately 4 million Facebook users receive spam from around 600,000
new or hijacked accounts each day [51, 80]. What’s worse is the success rates
of social spam: in Jan 2010, 0.13% of all spam URLs on twitter were visited by
around 1.6 million unsuspecting users [56]. This “clickthrough” rate is almost two
orders of magnitude larger than for email spam. Spammers cost businesses $20.5
billion annually in decreased productivity and technical expenses, and this cost
is projected to rise to $198 billion in the next four years [119]. There are two
prevalent methods to prevent this deluge of spam: CAPTCHA and proof-of-work ;
both methods have benefits and drawbacks [59].
A CAPTCHA can effectively protect an online transaction so long as there
aren’t OCR algorithms that can automatically “solve” or “break” it [124]. Once a
class of CAPTCHAs is broken, the corresponding application becomes defenseless
against spam bots. CAPTCHAs are also prone to outsourcing attacks where hu-
mans are employed to solve CAPTCHAs en masse. A major cause of success for
these attacks is that CAPTCHAs don’t provide a way to change the cost of solving
them [90, 91]. Additionally, the usability burden imposed by CAPTCHAs [147]
limits their use to only protecting infrequent transactions like creating accounts.
This leaves frequent transactions, like message posting, open to abuse. Attackers
exploit this loophole by hijacking accounts and using them to send spam.
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The Proof-of-work approach does not have CAPTCHA’s usability issues and
can therefore be used in frequent transactions. This is because the assigned “work”
can be done automatically by the user’s web browser without user intervention.
Additionally, this paradigm enables an application to price a transaction by varying
the amount of work that needs to be done as payment. The idea is to issue more
“work” to suspected spammers than to honest users, thus, effectively reducing
incoming spam.
The disadvantage of a proof-of-work approach is that the “work” done by users
is essentially wasted. The Reusable Proof-of-Work (RePoW) approach [64] pro-
poses using puzzles whose solutions can be used for a greater purpose (e.g. protein
folding [95]). The problem is that puzzles must be hard to solve and easy to check
if they are to be a practical spam prevention solution. Unfortunately, there are
very few known reusable proof-of-work puzzles whose solutions are easy to check
[64, 17]. What is needed is a proof-of-work system that enables issuing generic
puzzles (e.g. protein folding [95]) whose result can be checked more efficiently
than recomputing the puzzle itself.
6.1 APPLYING THE TRUST-BUT-VERIFY APPROACH
In this scenario, the puzzles are the generation functions and the result of solving
the puzzle is the data to verify. The goal then, is to develop a verification function
that allows a puzzle issuer to check the solution of a puzzle without having to
recompute it. This is done by bootstrapping the puzzle issuer with a set of known
puzzles — puzzles whose solutions are already known. Then, clients are issued a
sequence of known and unknown puzzles. Once the clients execute the puzzles and
return the solutions, the receiver verifies them by checking the solutions of only the
known puzzles. As long as clients cannot distinguish between known and unknown
puzzles, they will have no guaranteed way to pass verification. The details and
86
analysis of the verification process is presented in Section 6.5.3. Before the trust-
but-verify approach can be applied, however, we need to build the infrastructure
that allows issuing generic puzzles and accurately identifies malicious users so that
they can be issued more difficult puzzles.
6.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
This chapter describes MetaCAPTCHA, an application-agnostic spam prevention
service for the web. It can be used by applications like discussion forums, web-
mail, and social web sites. MetaCAPTCHA’s novelty stems from the following
contributions:
• It seamlessly integrates the CAPTCHA and proof-of-work approaches while
augmenting each: it can dynamically issue proof-of-work or CAPTCHA puz-
zles while ensuring that malicious users solve much “harder” puzzles —
CAPTCHAs included — than honest users. More specifically, our results
show that honest users were never issued a puzzle during 95% of their trans-
actions.
• Puzzles are randomly picked and delivered within a generic solver that even-
tually executes those puzzles in the user’s web browser. Thus, the solver
code is metamorphic: changing randomly in each transaction. This turns the
reverse engineering problem around on the adversary who must now attach
a debugger to discover the solver’s execution steps.
• It uses a Bayesian reputation system that can accurately predict a user’s
reputation score based on features configured by the web application. Since
multiple web applications can be protected by MetaCAPTCHA, its reputa-
tion system provides global visibility on attacks across all those applications.
• It contains a modular puzzle library that can be configured with new classes
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of CAPTCHAs or proof-of-work puzzles while allowing the removal of those
classes that are known to be “broken”. These puzzle library modifications
can be made by the web application without any change to its source code.
Furthermore, the variety of puzzles in the library ensures that breaking one
class of puzzles won’t compromise MetaCAPTCHA as a whole.
• Generic-puzzle solution verification. Proof-of-work approaches usually rely
on the puzzle construction to provide a short-cut for checking the puzzle
solution (otherwise verification would involve recomputing the costly puz-
zle). However, this severely limits the class of puzzles that can be issued.
MetaCAPTCHA has the ability to issue and verify the output of generic
computational tasks without having to redo those tasks. This facilitates the
use of volunteer computing projects [20] as puzzles. For example, see Sec-
tion 6.6.2 for the description of a puzzle that enables counting fish in the
Bonneville Dam [136] in Oregon, USA.
• Web applications can easily install the MetaCAPTCHA API by making
changes similar to those required by existing CAPTCHA implementations
[53, 99].
6.3 BACKGROUND
MetaCAPTCHA dynamically issues CAPTCHA and proof-of-work puzzles. We
now provide a brief background on each kind of puzzle.
6.3.1 CAPTCHA
CAPTCHA stands for “Completely Automated Public Turing-test to tell Com-
puters and Humans Apart”. CAPTCHAs usually consist of images containing
squiggly characters that are easy for humans to read, but hard for programs to
parse. If a respondent solves the CAPTCHA correctly, the implication is that the
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respondent is most likely human. The idea is to allow humans to access the web
application’s services while deterring automated adversaries like bots. A popular
implementation of the CAPTCHA is the reCAPTCHA [138]. Notice also, that the
verification strategy (in the trust-but-verify parlance) is to check the solution to
every CAPTCHA issued.
6.3.2 Proof-of-work
The proof-of-work approach was first proposed by Dwork and Naor [40] to combat
email spam. The idea was to impose a per-email cost on senders, where, the cost
was in terms of computational resources devoted by the sender to compute the pric-
ing function. Once a sender proved that it correctly computed the pricing function,
the server would send the email. As with CAPTCHAs, the verification strategy
is to validate the result of every pricing function issued. Effectively, sending bulk
spam would become “expensive” because computational resources are finite. The
characteristics of such a pricing function f was then described as follows:
1. “moderately” easy to compute
2. not amenable to amortization: given any l values m1, . . . ,ml, the cost of
computing f(mi) is similar to the cost of computing f(mj) where i 6= j. In
other words, no amount of pre-processing should make it easier to compute
f on any input.
3. Given x and y, it is easy to check if y = f(x)
An example of a pricing function is one that finds partial hash collisions [14]. A
function fk : x → y is said to compute a k-bit partial hash collision on string x,
if given a hash function H, the first k bits of H(x) are equal to the first k bits of
H(y). Notice that fk(·) has all the properties required of a pricing function.
Although the proof-of-work approach seemed promising, Laurie and Clayton
[74] demonstrated in 2004 that reducing spam to 1% of normal email would require
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delaying each message — including one that an honest user sends — by ≈ 6
minutes; a high price to pay for innocent users. This delay was computed based
on then current rates of spam, number of email users, and under the assumption
that 1 million compromised machines were spewing spam. Since then, spam has
increased by 18% to 74.2%, so we expect the aforementioned delay to be much
larger now.
To reduce this delay, Liu and Camp [77] proposed basing puzzle difficulties on
user reputation. The idea was that users with lower reputations would receive
harder puzzles than those with higher reputations. Since easier puzzles would be
much quicker to solve, honest users would experience a nominal delay when sending
messages where as malicious users may be significantly delayed. Thus, with an
accurate reputation system, the proof-of-work approach can be a practical, fair,
and effective technique for combating spam.
6.4 SYSTEM MODEL
This section describes the system model in which MetaCAPTCHA is applicable.
In general, interactive web applications where online transactions can be exploited
by spammers, such as message forums, webmail, social applications, and event-
ticket purchasing can employ MetaCAPTCHA for spam prevention. Heymann et
al. [59] provide an exhaustive discussion on the common characteristics of such
web applications.
An overview of the system model and high-level interactions between the Meta-
CAPTCHA service, the web client, and the corresponding web application is shown
in Figure 6.1. The interactions begin when a user attempts to perform an online
transaction. The web application allows the transaction to proceed only when it
has sufficient proof that the client completed the work it was assigned by Meta-
CAPTCHA.
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Figure 6.1: System model: user’s browser must show proof-of-work before the
web application accepts the user’s message. The dotted line indicates initial setup
performed by the web application to use the MetaCAPTCHA service.
The work is issued in the form of “puzzles”. Puzzles can be interactive, non-
interactive, or hybrid. Interactive puzzles are generally CAPTCHAs, whereas non-
interactive puzzles are pricing functions as described in Section 6.3.2. A hybrid
puzzle combines a CAPTCHA and a pricing function into one puzzle. Furthermore,
puzzles can either be known or unknown depending on whether their solutions are
already known or not.
As shown in Figure 6.1, we treat the user separate from the browser while
collectively referring to them both as the client. This is due to the existence of
interactive puzzles that need user interaction to solve, and non-interactive puzzles
that are solved automatically by the browser.
In the trust-but-verify context, the client is the data source and the Meta-
CAPTCHA service is the consumer. The function being validated is the puzzle
whose inputs are provided by MetaCAPTCHA. The goal is to ensure that the
source correctly computes or “solves” the puzzles. Details on how puzzle solutions
are verified are presented in Section 6.5.3.
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6.5 COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
This section discusses the MetaCAPTCHA communication protocol. For simplic-
ity, we assume the scenario where a client is attempting to post a message. Note,
however, that MetaCAPTCHA can protect more general web transactions like
purchasing event tickets, creating accounts, etc.
A web client begins communicating with MetaCAPTCHA after being referred
by the corresponding web application. In this case, the application will refer a
client attempting to post a message to MetaCAPTCHA. The client will then need
to obtain and solve a puzzle. The idea is that the web application will allow
messages from only those clients that have successfully solved a puzzle issued by
MetaCAPTCHA. The communication protocol for obtaining and solving a puzzle
begins with authentication as explained in the next section.
6.5.1 Authentication
MetaCAPTCHA only issues puzzles to clients of participating web applications.
This requires MetaCAPTCHA to authenticate two things, (i) the identity of the
web application, and (ii) the client is an authorized user of the web application.
MetaCAPTCHA provides each web application with an API key K during a reg-
istration phase. The web application must keep K secret as it will later be used
for authenticating both the application itself and all its clients.
User/
Client
TGS
Server
1
2 3
4
5
1. Request for TGS ticket
2. Ticket for TGS
3. Request for Server ticket
4. Ticket for Server
5. Request for service
Kerberos
Web Application
MetaCAPTCHA
Figure 6.2: Kerberos authentication overview and how it relates to Meta-
CAPTCHA authentication. Figure adapted from Steiner et al. [123]
92
As implied by the system model in Section 6.4, a client is not given access to the
services provided by the web application until it shows proof of a correctly solved
puzzle. The only way to be issued a puzzle is to first show that the client is an
authorized user of a registered web application. A client does so by presenting to
MetaCAPTCHA a “server-ticket” issued by the web application. The authentica-
tion protocol used is modeled around Kerberos [123], wherein the web application
acts as the Ticket-Granting-Server (TGS) for the MetaCAPTCHA service as shown
in Figure 6.2 [123]. Notice that steps 1 and 2 of the Kerberos protocol — where a
client authenticates itself to Kerberos — are not required because MetaCAPTCHA
assumes that it will be replaced by the web application’s existing authentication
mechanism (e.g password).
After a client submits a message, the web application returns a server-ticket
S1 = C||ID||HMAC(K,C||ID) containing client-specific information C, a web
application ID issued by MetaCAPTCHA during the registration phase, and a
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for C created using the web
application’s secret keyK (See Figure 6.3). The server-ticket S1 is called the puzzle-
request ticket and is sent by clients to MetaCAPTCHA for requesting puzzles.
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Figure 6.3: MetaCAPTCHA authentication and puzzle solution verification
When MetaCAPTCHA receives the puzzle-request-ticket S1, it verifies that the
client is indeed a user of a registered web application. MetaCAPTCHA performs
this verification by checking the integrity of the HMAC included in the ticket. No-
tice that the correct HMAC can only be generated by a registered web application
because it includes that application’s unique API key.
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Once the integrity of the HMAC is ascertained by MetaCAPTCHA, the client
is issued a puzzle to solve. Details of client-specific information C are presented in
Section 6.5.2.
6.5.2 Puzzle Delivery
MetaCAPTCHA only issues puzzles to authenticated clients as previously shown.
The hardness of the issued puzzle depends on the client-specific information C =
(timestamp, message data) sent by the client to MetaCAPTCHA during the au-
thentication phase. Here, timestamp indicates when the message was created (this
assumes the web application and MetaCAPTCHA are loosely time-synchronized);
message data contains the message text submitted by the client and any other
information related to it. MetaCAPTCHA uses the information in C to compute
a reputation score, which in turn is used to determine the puzzle difficulty level :
the amount of time a user’s browser must compute to provide sufficient proof-of-
work to the web application. In MetaCAPTCHA, higher reputation scores imply
more malicious clients. As a result, such clients are issued puzzles with increased
difficulty levels. The details of how reputation scores are computed, and how puz-
zles of varying difficulty are generated are presented in Sections 6.6.1 and 6.6.2
respectively.
Web
Browser MetaCAPTCHA
Issu
e Sub-puzzle
Return solution
1
2
Figure 6.4: The user’s web browser is continuously issued puzzles until it has spent
enough time computing. This amount of time is called the difficulty-level; more
malicious the client, the larger the puzzle difficulty-level.
It is important to note here that MetaCAPTCHA may issue multiple puzzles
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during a single puzzle solving session. Puzzles are continuously issued until the
client has computed for an amount of time similar to the estimated difficulty level.
Pre-determining a difficulty level eliminates the usual incentive of solving puzzles
faster. Furthermore, the estimated difficulty level is never directly revealed, thus
the client cannot make the decision to stop solving based on the amount of work
it needs to do. Figure 6.4 shows the puzzle solving protocol.
6.5.3 Puzzle Verification
Once the user’s browser has solved all puzzles, it must send back the final solu-
tions to MetaCAPTCHA. If the solutions are correct, MetaCAPTCHA will issue
the client a proof-of-work-ticket S2 = Ts||Te||HMAC(K,Ts||Te||S1), where Ts and
Te are the start and end time stamps of the puzzle solving session. The client
must present this ticket to the web application (see Figure 6.3), which will then
verify its integrity before allowing the client to complete posting the message. Ad-
ditionally, if the difference between the current time and Te is greater than some
threshold tdiff , the client’s proof-of-work ticket is considered to be expired and is
subsequently rejected.
Verifying a puzzle solution usually involves a short-cut method described by the
corresponding puzzle construction [108]. This ensures that the resources required
to verify a puzzle solution is less than that required to compute or “solve” the
puzzle. However, such short-cut methods may not always be available. Consider a
volunteer computing project like BOINC [20]. BOINC enables people to contribute
computational resources to scientific computing projects like protein folding [95,
128]. These projects divide the computational work among programs that can
be executed simultaneously by multiple processors. Then, computers owned by
BOINC volunteers retrieve these programs, execute them, and return the result
to the respective project. Essentially, MetaCAPTCHA could treat each of these
programs as a puzzle and issue them to clients. However, there are no readily
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available short-cuts to verify the solutions of such puzzles.
MetaCAPTCHA employs the trust-but-verify approach to check puzzle solu-
tions without having to recompute them. Here, the puzzle represents the genera-
tion function of the trust-but-verify approach. To build the verification function,
MetaCAPTCHA must first be bootstrapped with a set of puzzles whose solutions
are already known; let’s call this the set of known puzzles . Then, during a puzzle
solving session, MetaCAPTCHA issues a known puzzle with probability p or a
normal puzzle otherwise (one whose solution is not known). As long as a client
cannot distinguish between a normal puzzle and a known puzzle, it will have no
choice but to faithfully compute the solutions to all puzzles.
A client that cheats, one that sends back random numbers instead of actually
computing puzzle solutions, will eventually get caught. If we assume that a ma-
licious client cheats with probability q when issued a puzzle, then the probability
with which it will get caught is pq. The probability of the number of puzzles issued
before a cheating client is caught for the first time can be modeled as the negative
binomial distribution NB(1, 1 − pq). Here, the first parameter is the number of
cheat attempts before getting caught and the second parameter, 1 − pq, is the
probability of not getting caught when issued a puzzle. Given these parameters,
the number of puzzles expected to be issued before a cheating client is caught for
the first time can be written as
1− pq
pq
Additionally, MetaCAPTCHA can add to its set of known puzzles by incor-
porating the solutions of normal puzzles submitted by honest clients. An honest
client could be defined as one that gets the solutions to all known puzzles right.
However, this does not mean that the client did not cheat at all, but that cheating
was less likely. To see how likely, we quantify the probability that a cheater gets
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the solutions to each of the randomly injected known puzzles right as:
n∑
c=k
(
n
c
)
(1− q)cqn−c
Here, n represents the total number of puzzles issued in a single puzzle solving
session and k represents the number of known puzzles injected during that session.
Recall, that a known puzzle is injected with probability p so we expect that k =
p×n. As indicated by the above formula, the cheater faithfully solves the k injected
puzzles, but may or may not do the same for the rest of the puzzles.
Figure 6.5: Probability that a cheating client correctly solves each of the randomly
injected puzzles during a single puzzle solving session. The total number of puzzles
issued is n = 10, the number of randomly injected puzzles is k = p × n, and q
is the probability with which a client cheats i.e. responds with a random number
instead of actually solving the puzzle.
Figure 6.5 plots this probability for various values of p and q. We can see that
when p = 0.6 and q = 0.5, the probability that a cheater gets all known puzzles
right is less than 0.15. To further increase the confidence in the correctness of
a puzzle solution incorporated in the above manner, MetaCAPTCHA could also
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compare the solutions of multiple honest users. If a majority of honest clients get
the solution to a particular normal puzzle correct, then the corresponding puzzle
can be added to the known puzzle set. This approach is similar to the one used by
reCAPTCHA [53] where two CAPTCHAs, one whose solution is known and the
other not, are presented to the user.
6.6 SYSTEM COMPONENTS
In this section, we describe the main components of MetaCAPTCHA: the reputa-
tion service, the puzzle service, and the public API used by web applications and
their clients to access the aforementioned services. Briefly, the interactions between
these individual components begins when MetaCAPTCHA receives a client’s mes-
sage. This message is first handled by MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service, which
determines the client’s reputation score. The puzzle service then uses this score
to generate and issue a puzzle of an appropriate difficulty. Figure 6.6 shows an
overview of the various MetaCAPTCHA components and interactions, while the
following sections describe each of them.
Puzzle
Service
Reputation Service
DB
API
Client Server
Authenticators,
Session State,
Puzzles
Reputation
Score
Blacklists, Akismet, etc.
Client
Browser Web App
Puzzle
ClassiﬁerDB
Training DataPuzzle Request
Figure 6.6: Design of MetaCAPTCHA
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6.6.1 Reputation Service
Proof-of-work systems that do not assign more “work” to malicious clients than
legitimate ones are easily circumvented [74]. Many existing systems do vary the
amount of work, but fail to characterize maliciousness appropriately. For example,
they base maliciousness on just one feature, such as system load [33, 67], a client’s
request rate [45, 46], contents of the request [149], or service demand [140, 141].
Without a defense-in-depth approach, it is unlikely that proof-of-work systems will
be able to effectively deter automated adversaries. Additionally, if a reputation
system intends to be widely deployed, it must be capable of adapting to the needs
of individual applications [77]. For example, Twitter may associate low reputation
with accounts that show aggressive following behavior [135], whereas Facebook
may do the same for accounts with abnormally large amount of ignored friend
requests [24]. MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service addresses these issues by al-
lowing applications to easily configure the features that will determine a client’s
reputation score, and then use a Naive Bayes classifier to generically predict the
score based on the values of the configured features.
The reputation score is the probability that a given message is spam as deter-
mined by a Naive Bayes classifier. A client’s reputation score is calculated each
time she posts a message to the web application and is dependent on the features
of the message and the client that sent it. A feature is any metric with a finite
set of values. For example, blacklist status of the message’s source IP address,
SpamAssasin score of the message, or number of times the poster was “thanked”.
Given such message features and any other client-related features provided by the
web application, MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service can generate the client’s
reputation score.
An important characteristic of a reputation system is its ability to react to
a client’s changing reputation. For example, if a user’s account is hijacked by a
spammer, her account’s reputation worsens; however, once the threat from the
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hijacker is neutralized (say, by a password change) the reputation goes back to
normal. Thus, a good reputation service must be capable of identifying these
changes and assigning scores accordingly. MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service
adapts to reputation changes by incorporating time-varying features in determining
the reputation score. For example, relative account age, and relative number of
positive votes a user’s posts have received.
The reputation service is initialized by training the classifier using ground-truth
feature values for messages that have already been posted. Training information
about each message must include the values for each feature and its classification
as spam or ham (not spam). The information about all messages is then fed to the
classifier, which builds a probability model to determine how likely a given new
message is spam. This likelihood or probability is called the reputation score and
its value ranges from 0 to 1 with higher scores implying more malicious users.
6.6.2 Puzzle Service
The puzzle service is responsible for authenticating users, using the contents of
their transaction (e.g. message, IP address) to obtain a reputation score from the
reputation service, converting that score to a puzzle difficulty, and finally, issuing
the user a puzzle of that difficulty. Note that the authentication protocol was
described in Section 6.5.1. In the following sections, we discuss the remaining
responsibilities of the puzzle service.
Reputation Score to Puzzle Difficulty
As mentioned before, puzzle difficulty is the amount of time a client must be kept
busy solving a puzzle. Traditionally, most puzzles have been CPU bound, caus-
ing devices with different processing speeds to solve the same puzzle for different
amounts of time. Abadi et al. highlighted this issue and proposed memory-bound
functions since memory access speeds vary much less across devices [6]. Memory
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bound puzzles, unfortunately, are expensive to create and verify [36, 30]. Fur-
thermore, memory-bound puzzles limit the types of computation that can be per-
formed: we envisage a future where puzzles are generic computations whose results
are eventually reusable for solving larger problems like climate modeling, or curing
cancer [128].
MetaCAPTCHA’s approach is to first, determine the puzzle difficulty solely
based on the reputation score — in units of time — and then, continuously issue
puzzles until the client has computed for that pre-determined amount of time.
The advantage of this approach is that it gets rid of an adversary’s incentive to
solve puzzles quicker (e.g by oﬄoading, or parallelizing the computation). What is
needed then, is a formula for converting the reputation score to a puzzle difficulty;
the rest of this section derives such a formula.
Intuitively, the formula must ensure that puzzle difficulty is proportional to the
reputation score since larger scores imply more malicious users. The remaining
questions, then, are (i) how fast should the difficulty grow with respect to the
reputation score?, and (ii) for any given reputation score, what should the difficulty
value be to effectively reduce the amount of spam the web application receives?
The answer to Question (ii) is inspired by work on the impact of proof-of-work
systems on reducing spam by Laurie and Clayton [74]. We begin by fixing the
amount of spam reduction δ the web application seeks as a fraction of the total
number of spam messages sp it receives in time period tp. We can then determine
the maximum difficulty or amount of time tmax a spammer must be kept busy to
reduce the spam to sp − δsp:
tmax =
tp
sp(1− δ)
Notice that if the desired spam reduction δ = 1, the hardest puzzle a spammer
may have to solve would be infinitely long; causing MetaCAPTCHA to forever
wait for a solution! Since this is not feasible, the spam reduction fraction δ must
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be judiciously chosen. Additionally, the tighter the choice of tp for the same sp, the
more accurate tmax will be. For example, assume a forum receives its first spam
message of the day at 8:00 am and last spam message at 5:00 pm. Then, choosing
tp = 9 hours as opposed to, say 24 hours, will lead to a more accurate value of
tmax.
Now, the answer to question (i) depends on how accurately the reputation
service can determine a user’s reputation score; the more accurate it is, the less
time honest clients should have to spend solving puzzles. We will see later that
MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service aptly assigns≈ 90% of spammers a score over
0.95. Since the reputation service is fairly accurate, we must fashion a function
that grows slowly until large reputation scores and then steeply afterwards. In
the case of the reference web application used to evaluate MetaCAPTCHA (see
Section 6.8.1), we empirically settled on the exponential function with a growth
constant of 5. However, another web application could choose a different growth
constant based on the shape of the curve desired.
Given the aforementioned growth function and maximum puzzle difficulty tmax,
we can compute the corresponding maximum reputation score rmax:
tmax = e
5rmax − 1
=⇒ rmax = ln(tmax + 1)
5
We can then normalize the user’s current reputation score r with respect to rmax
and subsequently calculate puzzle difficulty t:
t = e5r·rmax − 1
=⇒ t = (tmax + 1)r − 1
Notice that when reputation score r = 1 (most malicious) the puzzle difficulty
t = tmax. Furthermore, when r = 0 (most honest), t = 0. This implies that an
honest user may not have to solve a puzzle at all, whereas a malicious user may
have to solve the hardest one.
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Issuing Puzzles
Once the puzzle difficulty t is determined, the puzzle service randomly generates
a puzzle based on the list that is configured. The puzzle is then issued to the
client who must solve it and return a solution. If the solution is returned in
time t′ < t, then a new puzzle is chosen and issued. This process is repeated
until the client has computed for at least t amount of time. The idea behind
issuing several puzzles is to ensure that no user can complete an online transaction
unless they have computed for a length of time ≥ t. An alternative is to first
determine how long it takes to solve a puzzle, and then just generate and issue
that puzzle. Unfortunately, the amount of time it takes to solve a puzzle varies
on different platforms, and clients may get issued unfairly long or short puzzles
[6, 39]. For this reason, MetaCAPTCHA first computes puzzle difficulty in units
of time, and then has the client solve puzzles for that amount of time. Also, notice
that the puzzle difficulty t is never revealed to the client, thus, there is no way
to know how long the computation will last. This creates a disincentive for bots
that would normally abandon puzzle computation altogether if t were known to
be large beforehand. An additional advantage of issuing multiple puzzles is that
each one can be randomly chosen, thus, preventing an attacker from being able
to predict the puzzles she will be issued. This eliminates a critical advantage an
adversary normally possesses: oﬄine reverse engineering to find weaknesses. The
next section discusses the various puzzle types supported by MetaCAPTCHA.
Puzzle Types
Essentially, a puzzle type is a parameterized function. A puzzle-type with an
instantiated set of parameters is called a puzzle. Puzzles that require human inter-
action to solve (e.g. CAPTCHA) are called interactive puzzles, while those that
don’t (e.g. proof-of-work), are called non-interactive puzzles. MetaCAPTCHA
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additionally supports hybrid puzzles that have both an interactive and a proof-
of-work component. The choice of which puzzle types to use depends on the web
application’s needs (See Figure 6.7).
Figure 6.7: MetaCAPTCHA’s puzzle configuration dashboard.
Thus, MetaCAPTCHA is quite flexible and can be easily configured to sup-
port new types of puzzles. In fact, MetaCAPTCHA is so named because it is
a metamorphic puzzle issuing system and because it issues meta-puzzles rather
than specific puzzles. It is metamorphic because the client-side puzzle solver code
is non-deterministic. More specifically, the non-determinism results from issuing
unpredictable puzzles within a generic puzzle solver — the meta-puzzle. Thus, the
adversary has no way to know the client-side MetaCAPTCHA code beforehand.
Furthermore, issuing a meta-puzzle ensures that finding a weakness in one puzzle
type does not compromise MetaCAPTCHA as a whole. As mentioned earlier, a
puzzle can additionally be known or unknown, depending on whether its solution
already known or not. The following paragraphs discuss the currently supported
puzzle types.
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Hint-based Hash-Reversal (non-interactive) Hash-reversal puzzles force clients
to reverse a given cryptographic hash of a random input, say x, with the k most
significant bits erased. However, they lack fine-grained difficulty control because
increasing k linearly, increases the solution search space exponentially. Hint-based
hash-reversal puzzles address this drawback by providing an additional hint : the
range of values to search.
Targeted Hash-Reversal (non-interactive) A targeted hash-reversal puzzle
[45] with difficulty d forces a client compute an expected number d of hashes before
finding the right answer.
Modified Time-Lock (non-interactive) Time-lock puzzles [108] are based on
repeated squaring, a sequential process that forces the client to compute in a
tight loop for an amount of time that can be precisely controlled. Modified time-
lock puzzles on the other hand, retain most of the original properties of time-lock
puzzles, but are faster to generate and verify [44].
Fish Counting (non-interactive) Requires clients to execute a machine learn-
ing algorithm that counts fishes in an underwater image of a section of Bonneville
Dam [136]. The fish counting algorithm was adapted from an openly available al-
gorithm that detects cats in an image [58]. Verifying the correctness of the solution
involves issuing the same puzzle to multiple users and picking the majority answer
as the correct one. This is similar to the verification mechanism currently used by
reCAPTCHA [53]. The inclusion of this puzzle signifies a first step towards using
MetaCAPTCHA as a platform for issuing proof-of-work puzzles whose solutions
are useful in solving other problems.
CAPTCHA (interactive) A reCAPTCHA [138] or Securimage [99] CAPTCHA
relayed to the client. MetaCAPTCHA only acts as a proxy for these CAPTCHA
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services.
CAPTCHA+ (hybrid) A CAPTCHA+ puzzle includes a reCAPTCHA or Se-
curimage CAPTCHA along with a modified time-lock puzzle in the background.
The advantage of combining the approaches, in this case, is that changing the
difficulty of the time-lock puzzle changes the cost of solving the CAPTCHA. Con-
sequently, hybrid puzzles could circumvent CAPTCHA outsourcing attacks [90, 91]
since they enable the CAPTCHA solving cost to be changed.
6.6.3 Public API
The public API allows web applications and their clients to access MetaCAPTCHA
services. A web application uses the server-side API to (i) register and maintain
its account with MetaCAPTCHA, and (ii) as described in Section 6.5.1, use the
account’s unique API key to generate puzzle-request tickets for all its clients.
Web application clients implicitly use the client-side API during an online trans-
action, e.g. posting a message. More specifically, the API method calls are em-
bedded in the client-side web page that accepts the online transaction (similar to
a CAPTCHA setup). When the user “submits” the transaction, the client-side
API is used to obtain a puzzle-request ticket from the web application and hand
it over to the MetaCAPTCHA service. Once MetaCAPTCHA returns a puzzle,
the client uses the solver — also a part of the client-side API — to compute and
return the puzzle solution.
6.7 IMPLEMENTATION
MetaCAPTCHA has been deployed and has a public API that can be downloaded
and used by interested parties. A Beta version of the MetaCAPTCHA service can
be found at http://www.metacaptcha.com/metacaptcha/. We now discuss the
implementation details of each MetaCAPTCHA component in Figure 6.6.
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6.7.1 Reputation Service
The reputation service is implemented in PHP. Associated with this service is a
NoSQL database, MongoDB [5], that stores the feature data necessary to deter-
mine user reputation. Initially, the web application provides the rows of feature
data necessary to train a Naive Bayes classifier implemented in Java by the Weka
[79] library. The trained classifier is then saved and used later when classifying new
messages sent by the web application’s users. Instead of using the binary classifi-
cation — spam or ham — that normally is the output of a Naive Bayes classifier,
the reputation service uses the probability distribution that the classifier deter-
mines in the step before performing the classification. That distribution provides
the percentage likelihood that a given message is spam and this very likelihood
represents MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation score.
To enable the reputation service to compute accurate reputation scores, a web
application can provide existing message and user data for training the classifier.
In the case of our reference web application, a live discussion forum that employed
MetaCAPTCHA’s spam prevention services from September 1st to October 19th
2012, the classifier was given the following feature values for each existing message
in the forum:
• Relative “Thanks” or “Likes”: the proportion of positive votes received by
the sender of the message.
• Language: the language the forum message was written in.
• Relative account age: the proportion of time an account has been alive with
respect to the age of the forum.
• Relative post count: the proportion of total posts published by a given ac-
count.
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• DShield “Attacks” attribute: number of packets, from the message’s source
to a distinct destination, that were blocked.
• GEOIP: an estimate of the distance between the message poster and forum
server.
• Blacklist score: reputation score of the message source from Spamhaus [130].
The higher the score, the more malicious the source.
• Akismet score: Akismet [10] is a spam detection service that assigns a score
of 1 to a message it thinks is spam and 0 otherwise.
• SA Score: the spam score as determined by the SpamAssassin [120] service
running with only the Bayes plugin. The Bayes plugin uses a Naive Bayes
classifier to determine the probability that the contents of a message resemble
spam. SpamAssasin assigns a spam score between 1 and 5 to each message;
5 indicating that a message is most likely spam and 1 indicating that its not.
• isSpam: “yes” if forum moderator flagged the message as spam, “no” other-
wise.
6.7.2 Puzzle Service
The puzzle service is implemented in PHP. Associated with this service is an in-
stance of the mongoDB [5] that stores credentials necessary to authenticate a
particular web application’s clients, session details while the client is solving the
issued puzzles, and the puzzles themselves. The authentication credentials include
the web application’s 96-bit API key and an application ID; the session details
store the received server ticket (see Sections 6.5.1, 6.5.2) and the amount of time
the client has spent solving puzzles. This amount of time when subtracted from
the puzzle difficulty level determines if the client needs a new sub-puzzle or not
(see Section 6.6.2); the puzzles themselves are stored in the database as members
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of JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) objects and delivered in that format to
clients. The parsing and execution of these JSON objects by client-side JavaScript
engines can be thought of as “solving” a puzzle.
6.7.3 Client API
The client API includes JavaScript methods to request puzzles from MetaCAPTCHA,
execute or “solve” them, and return the result of the execution. These methods
must be embedded in an HTML form that accepts content from the users on be-
half of the web application. As part of “submitting” that form, the client API will
initiate the MetaCAPTCHA protocol to request a puzzle (see Section 6.5). The
puzzle will be returned as a JSON object that the client must parse, evaluate, and
then return the resulting value to MetaCAPTCHA.
The entire MetaCAPTCHA protocol occurs behind-the-scenes after a user
clicks the “Submit” button. This behind-the-scenes behavior is enabled by the
AJAX (Asynchronous JavaScript and XML) technique used to implement the
MetaCAPTCHA communication protocol. Furthermore, puzzle execution is also
pushed to the background by employing JavaScript worker threads [139] which are
now supported in newer versions of most popular browsers.
6.7.4 Server API
The server API consists of ≈ 150 lines of PHP code and requires minor modi-
fications to the web application for its default configuration. The modifications
are similar to those required by existing CAPTCHA APIs like reCAPTCHA [138].
Web applications use the server API to receive a client’s message, issue the cor-
responding server ticket necessary to request a puzzle from MetaCAPTCHA, and
verify the proof-of-work presented by clients that have solved the issued puzzle
(see Section 6.5).
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6.8 RESULTS
We now evaluate MetaCAPTCHA and show that its defense-in-depth approach
improves spammer identification, that this identification is accurate, and that it is
an efficient spam prevention service.
6.8.1 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup used in our evaluation includes a MetaCAPTCHA server
with a 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon quad-core processor running Red Hat Linux on a 2.6.18
kernel. A live discussion forum active from September 1st to October 19th 2012
employed MetaCAPTCHA as its spam prevention service. MetaCAPTCHA’s ef-
fectiveness and performance has been evaluated in the context of this forum. At
the time, the forum had 2282 messages from 485 users in 112 sub-forums contain-
ing 997 conversation threads. Upon registration, the forum provided most of this
historical user and message data to help train MetaCAPTCHA’s Naive Bayes clas-
sifier in identifying spam. Since the provided data was considered ground-truth, a
part of it was used to train the classifier and the rest to evaluate it. The classifica-
tion (spam or ham) was then compared with ground-truth to judge the classifier’s
effectiveness. The data consisted of values for all features described in Section 6.7.1
for each of 1442 messages posted to the forum. We now describe the experiments
used to evaluate MetaCAPTCHA.
6.8.2 Defense-in-Depth
Defense-in-depth implies the use of multiple features to determine user reputation
as opposed to only one or a few. Recall that a user’s reputation score is the prob-
ability that the message she is posting is spam. This probability is determined
by the Naive Bayes classifier. If the probability that a message is spam is higher
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than the probability that it is not, the classifier tags the message as spam. There-
fore, the better the classifier is at identifying spam, the better it is at identifying
spammers and assigning appropriate reputation scores.
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Figure 6.8: Defense-in-depth: using multiple features for spam classification is
better than using one or a few. “Total” implies that all-of-the above features were
used for training the classifier.
We evaluated the spam identification accuracy of the classifier by using stan-
dard machine learning techniques. The idea was to measure the classifier’s precision
and recall ; precision is the fraction of messages that are actually spam (or ham)
among those classified as spam (or ham); recall is the fraction of actual spam (or
ham) that gets classified correctly. A commonly used combined metric is the har-
monic mean of precision and recall, called the F-measure. Higher the F-measure,
better the classifier is at identifying spam.
We used 10-fold cross-validation to train and test the classifier on feature data
for 1442 messages. During each train-and-test run we limited the set of features
that the classifier could use. More specifically, in all but the last run, the classifier
was trained on one distinct feature. However, in the last run, it was trained on
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all features together. The F-measure was then computed and plotted for each of
the runs. We can see in Figure 6.8 that the classifier’s F-measure is largest when
using all features together than when using any single one.
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Figure 6.9: Reputation Accuracy: CDF of reputation scores and puzzle difficulties
assigned to spammers, non-spammers, and mixed users (those that sent at least 1
spam and 1 ham)
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6.8.3 Reputation Accuracy
We evaluated the accuracy with which MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service dis-
tinguished between spammers and honest users. To do this, we first divided forum
users into one of three categories, (i) spammers : those who sent only spam, (ii)
non-spammers : those who sent no spam, and (ii) mixed : those who sent both spam
and ham. Here, ’users’ implies the senders of messages included in ground-truth
information provided by the forum. After the categorization, there were 99 mes-
sages sent by non-spammers, 240 messages sent by spammers, and 151 messages
sent by mixed users in the test set (34% of ground-truth data picked uniformly
at random). We then fed these messages to MetaCAPTCHA’s classifier and ex-
tracted the reputation scores from the output (note that reputation scores range
from 0 to 1 and higher scores imply more malicious users). Finally, we plotted a
CDF of reputation scores for each category of users.
Figure 6.9(a) shows that ≈ 90% of spammers have reputation scores over 0.95,
whereas ≈ 99% of non-spammers got a reputation of 0.065 or less. Among the
honest users, only one suffered the ill fate of being assigned a reputation of 0.88,
whereas 94% were assigned a reputation of zero — implying that they did not solve
a puzzle at all!
Interestingly, mixed users were treated largely as non-spammers. To under-
stand why, we further analyzed messages sent by these users and realized that a
majority of the users had posted vastly more ham than spam (see Figure 6.10).
Thus, justifying their lower reputation scores.
Although reputation scores have accurately identified spammers from non-
spammers, MetaCAPTCHA’s success depends on issuing harder puzzles to more
malicious users. This requires evaluating the function that converts reputation
score to puzzle difficulty (see Section 6.6.2). We first computed the maximum
puzzle difficulty tmax = 6.82 hrs based on time period tp = 1 month, number of
spam messages sp seen in that month, and a spam reduction factor δ = 0.6. We
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Figure 6.10: Distribution of spam and ham sent by mixed users. Mixed users sent
very little spam (between 1 and 8) when compared to the total messages they
posted. Note: columns that exceeded the y-scale have explicitly marked y-values
then plotted a CDF, shown in Figure 6.9(b), of the difficulty of puzzles issued to
spammers, non-spammers, and mixed users for each message they sent. We can see
that in this scenario, ≈ 90% of spammers solved a puzzle over 6 hrs long, ≈ 5% of
non-spammers solved a puzzle between 7.2 secs and 8.4 minutes long, and ≈ 95%
of non-spammers solved no puzzles at all.
6.8.4 Performance
We evaluated the performance of MetaCAPTCHA in terms of CPU usage, memory
consumption, and time spent in authenticating and issuing puzzles to users. We
used Apache JMeter [126], a Java application that load-tests servers, to generate 1
- 100 concurrent puzzle requests incrementing each time by 20 to MetaCAPTCHA.
Each test run (e.g 1, 20, 40, etc.) was repeated over a 100 times and the average
measurement (e.g CPU usage) was plotted against the number of concurrent con-
nections. The 95% confidence interval for the mean of each measurement was also
calculated. However, the intervals might be too small to spot in the graphs.
114
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
1
2
3
Concurrent Connections (count)
Ti
m
e
(s
ec
s)
(a) Time
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
11
12
13
14
15
Concurrent Connections (count)
CP
U
Us
ag
e
(%
)
(b) CPU usage
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Concurrent Connections (count)
M
em
or
y
Us
ag
e
(M
B)
(c) Memory used
Figure 6.11: Performance overhead of MetaCAPTCHA when issuing the first puz-
zle.
Figures 6.11(a) - 6.11(c) show the amount of time, CPU, and memory con-
sumed to authenticate the user, determine reputation score and puzzle difficulty,
and generate the first puzzle. Although the time consumed was not prohibitive,
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we were interested in determining where most of it was used. A more detailed
analysis, shown in Figure 6.12, revealed that a majority of the time was spent in
the reputation service when querying other remote services like Akismet [10], and
blacklists like Spamhaus [130].
68 2
30 Reputation Service
Authentication
Puzzle Generation
Figure 6.12: Breakdown (%) of the time spent in issuing the first puzzle. Notice
that 68% of the time is spent in the reputation service due to all the remote queries
that happen there.
In the future, we hope to eliminate remote queries and mirror the applicable
blacklists to significantly reduce the time required for issuing the first puzzle. Note
that after the first puzzle, issuing subsequent ones only requires generating a new
random puzzle (without the need for computing puzzle difficulty, or authenticating
the user). Figures 6.13(a) - 6.13(c) depict the resources consumed while issuing
subsequent puzzles.
6.9 SECURITY ANALYSIS
MetaCAPTCHA’s goal is to address threats from automated adversaries like spam
bots. The following paragraphs discuss those threats and how MetaCAPTCHA
defends against them.
116
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
Concurrent Connections (count)
Ti
m
e
(s
ec
s)
(a) Time
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
5
10
15
Concurrent Connections (count)
CP
U
Us
ag
e
(%
)
(b) CPU usage
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Concurrent Connections (count)
M
em
or
y
Us
ag
e
(M
B)
(c) Memory used
Figure 6.13: MetaCAPTCHA performance overhead when issuing subsequent puz-
zles.
Bots may attempt to post spam in the web application. However, with Meta-
CAPTCHA protections in place, those attempts will result in a puzzle-request-
ticket. Thus, preventing any efforts to directly post spam.
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Bots may attempt to show proof-of-work without ever doing the work. However,
they will be unable to forge a proof-of-work-ticket without the web application’s
secret API key.
Bots could present a proof-of-work-ticket for one message, but try to post an-
other. However, since proof-of-work-tickets contain a digest of the original message,
the ticket’s verification will fail when associated with a new message.
Bots could replay old proof-of-work-tickets. However, as mentioned in Section
6.5.2, clients only have a small amount of time tdiff to submit the proof-of-work
ticket. Thus, the same ticket cannot be replayed after tdiff time.
Bots could find short-cut methods to solve puzzles. However, since Meta-
CAPTCHA forces adversaries to solve puzzles for a pre-determined amount of
time (the puzzle difficulty), solving a puzzle faster will only result in more puzzles
to solve.
Bots may attempt to reuse the solutions of puzzles solved in the past. Recall,
that puzzles are randomly selected and parameterized before being issued. Thus,
bots will have to store an old puzzle in hopes of finding an exact match sometime
in the future. We conjecture that this probability is negligible for the types of
puzzles currently supported.
MetaCAPTCHA could be the target of a DoS attack where a flood of puzzle
requests cause it to create state for an unsustainable number of puzzle solving
sessions. However, effects of such attacks can be mitigated by using puzzle out-
sourcing techniques [142].
MetaCAPTCHA determines a user’s reputation based on information related
to messages posted by that user (e.g. contents, source IP). This may be a privacy
concern for those who may trust the web application with their messages, but
not MetaCAPTCHA. A possible solution to this problem is to eliminate privacy-
sensitive features from being used for determining reputation. The drawback,
however, would be reduced reputation score accuracy. Another way, would be
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to empower the application to provide a local reputation score based on privacy-
sensitive features. This local score could then be combined with the one determined
remotely by MetaCAPTCHA to provide an accurate characterization of reputation.
We hope to explore these avenues in future research.
Currently, MetaCAPTCHA issues puzzles without considering the platform
it will be solved on. Thus, some clients may solve puzzles for longer than the
amount of time determined by MetaCAPTCHA. One possibility is to use browser
fingerprinting techniques [92] to determine a client’s CPU speed and then issue
puzzles accordingly. We also hope to address this direction of research in future
work.
6.10 RELATED WORK
This section discusses relevant spam prevention schemes and how they relate to
MetaCAPTCHA: the two prevalent ones are CAPTCHAs and proof-of-work [59].
CAPTCHAs come in many shapes and forms: textual CAPTCHAs require
users to identify distorted letters [138, 99], visual CAPTCHAs require users to
identify the content or characteristics of an image (e.g. orientation [54]), and
audio CAPTCHAs usually require users to identify words in a noisy environment
[118]. However, CAPTCHAs are not always fun to solve, so systems like Mollom
[86] selectively issue them to only those users that appear to be posting spam.
CAPTCHAs have also helped digitize books: words in scanned books that cannot
be deciphered by character recognition programs are used as reCAPTCHAs [138].
MetaCAPTCHA can incorporate the above CAPTCHAs with the added benefit
of a difficulty setting.
Proof-of-work systems that discourage spam include Hashcash, a system that
requires senders to attach “postage” to e-mail [15]. The postage is a partial hash
collision on a string derived from the recipient’s email address. Another proof-
of-work solution for throttling email spam was presented by Zhong et al. [149].
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However, unlike Hashcash, their system based puzzle difficulty on the “spammi-
ness” of the message. Feng et al. proposed kaPoW [44], a reputation-based proof-
of-work system to discourage spam in webmail. There have also been proposals
to put proof-of-work to good use. Jakobsson and Juels first suggested reusing
the solutions to proof-of-work puzzles [64]. They described how a coin-minting
operation could be broken up into several proof-of-work puzzles. CloudFlare [55]
recently proposed using collaborative distributed computations like protein fold-
ing [128] as proof-of-work puzzles. MetaCAPTCHA incorporates the features of
above proof-of-work systems while augmenting them with a generic puzzle issu-
ing and verification mechanism along with a comprehensive reputation service.
Furthermore, MetaCAPTCHA can be easily configured and used by generic web
applications.
6.11 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented MetaCAPTCHA, an application-agnostic spam prevention service
for the web. MetaCAPTCHA seamlessly integrates the CAPTCHA and proof-of-
work approaches while augmenting each: it can dynamically issue proof-of-work
or CAPTCHA puzzles while ensuring that malicious users solve much “harder”
puzzles than honest users. Web applications can configure MetaCAPTCHA to
issue different classes of puzzles and even add new ones; regardless of whether
there are short-cut methods to check their solutions. A configurable library of
puzzles also ensures that weaknesses in one class of puzzles won’t compromise
MetaCAPTCHA as a whole. We evaluated MetaCAPTCHA in the context of
a reference web application and showed that 95% of honest users hardly notice
MetaCAPTCHA’s presence, whereas the remaining 5% were required to solve very
“easy” puzzles before accessing the application’s services. In the future, we hope
to improve MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation system by incorporating new spam clas-
sification algorithms. Additionally, we would like to work towards transforming
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MetaCAPTCHA into a proxy for volunteer computing projects like BOINC [20], so
that useful computations like protein folding [128] can be issued as proof-of-work
puzzles.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
Online applications that encourage open participation remain vulnerable to spu-
rious information. This dissertation presented the trust-but-verify approach, a
framework that enables applications to determine the integrity of the received in-
formation and thereby reject information that is spurious. The trust-but-verify
approach enables applications to independently verify the integrity of data pub-
lished by each user, and do so as often as necessary. This, in turn, enables the
application to verify less information from a participant it trusts more, and ver-
ify more information from a participant it trusts less. How much of the received
information is checked, depends on how tolerant the application is to spurious
information and the resources it can devote to integrity checking. Thus, an appli-
cation can trade-off performance for more integrity, or vice versa. The key idea
behind the trust-but-verify approach is that it first identifies or defines data gen-
eration functions that data sources will use to create and publish information, and
then, enables the respective application to verify that the data generation func-
tions were faithfully executed. The challenge is in building verification methods
that satisfy the constraints of individual applications. This dissertation described
how the trust-but-verify approach can be used to enable high-integrity privacy-
preserving crowd-sourced sensing, non-intrusive cheat detection in online games,
and effective spam prevention in online messaging applications.
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7.1 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This dissertation developed verification procedures for information received in spe-
cific applications. However, a future area of research is to develop general verifica-
tion procedures for entire classes of applications. Also, the trust-but-verify model
currently assumes a single intermediary aggregator. In the future, it will be useful
to evaluate the trust-but-verify approach in a model where there are multiple ag-
gregators accepting data from multiple overlapping sources. Another interesting
avenue for future research, is the feasibility of using the trust-but-verify approach
in “big data” systems.
7.2 CONTRIBUTION SUMMARY
Table 7.1 highlights the contributions of the trust-but-verify approach in crowd-
sourced sensing applications, online games, and spam prevention systems.
App. Domain Threats State-of-art Our Approach
Crowd-sourced
sensing
Integrity: mas-
querading, data
fabrication;
Privacy: loca-
tion exposure
Reputation rankings: not
resistant to masquerading
(a.k.a Sybil) attacks, no
privacy
Per-participant root-of-
trust + Private data
verification using homo-
morphic commitments
Online games Information ex-
posure cheats
Server-side view tracking:
too expensive
Client tracks view, server
checks view
Spam preven-
tion systems
spam spam filters: don’t reduce
spam;
CAPTCHA: can be
fooled, can’t protect
hijacked accounts
impose cost per message:
force adversary to solve a
puzzle whose result is use-
ful to another application
Table 7.1: Contribution Summary
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